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Predictably Incoherent Judgments 
 
 
Cass R. Sunstein,* Daniel Kahneman,** David Schkade, ***  and Ilana Ritov**** 
 
Abstract 
 
When people make moral or legal judgments in isolation, they produce a pattern 
of outcomes that they would themselves reject, if only they could see that pattern as a 
whole. A major reason is that human thinking is category-bound. When people see a case 
in isolation, they spontaneously compare it to other cases that are mainly drawn from the 
same category of harms. When people are required to compare cases that involve different 
kinds of harms, judgments that appear sensible when the problems are considered 
separately often appear incoherent and arbitrary in the broader context. Another major 
source of incoherence is what we call the translation problem: The translation of moral 
judgments into the relevant metrics of dollars and years is not grounded in either 
principle or intuition, and produces large differences among people.. The incoherence 
produced by category-bound thinking is illustrated by an experimental study of punitive 
damages and contingent valuation. We also show how category-bound thinking and the 
translation problem combine to produce anomalies in administrative penalties.  The 
underlying phenomena  have large implications for many topics in law, including jury 
behavior, the valuation of public goods, punitive damages, criminal sentencing, and civil 
fines. We consider institutional reforms that might overcome the problem of predictably 
incoherent judgments.  Connections are also drawn to several issues in legal theory, 
including valuation of life, incommensurability,  and the aspiration to global coherence in 
adjudication. 
 
“Why didn’t the Commission sit down and really go and rationalize this 
thing . . .? The short answer to that is: We couldn’t. . . . Try listing all the crimes 
that there are in rank order of punishable merit. . . . Then collect results from 
your friends and see if they all match. I will tell you they don’t.”1 
                                                           
* Karl N. Llewellyn Distinguished Service Professor, University of Chicago. 
** Eugene Higgins Professor of Psychology and Professor of Public Affairs, Princeton University 
*** Herbert D. Kelleher Professor of Business, University of Texas, Austin. 
**** Associate Professor, Hebrew University of Jerusalem. For helpful comments, we are grateful to Eric 
Posner, Richard Posner, and participants  in workshops at the John F. Kennedy School of Government at 
Harvard University, the University of Chicago Law School, and Yale Law School. 
1 Justice Stephen Breyer, as quoted in The New Republic, June 6, 1994, at p. 12.   2
I. Introduction: Coherence and Incoherence 
 
A. Basic Claims 
 
Coherence in law is a widely shared ideal.  Almost everyone hopes for a 
legal system in which the similarly situated are treated similarly.  But there are 
many obstacles to the achievement of coherence in the law.  This Article is 
concerned with one particular test of coherence, and with two cognitive 
limitations that help cause many failures of that test in actual legal systems. We 
believe that these failures are also failures of justice, and that they suggest a 
pervasive problem in existing legal systems.  
 
Our test of coherence is straightforward.  We ask: When two or more 
judgments have been made separately, and each seems to make sense on its own, 
do they still make sense when considered together? When this test fails, and a 
need is felt to adjust or reverse the judgments that were made separately, we will 
speak of judgment reversals. The test of coherence can be readily applied to 
decisions by juries and by judges.2 With suitable modifications, it can also be 
applied to acts of legislators and regulators. More generally, we ask whether 
judgments made in isolation fit together in an orderly way when considered as 
part of the larger whole.  
 
Our emphasis will be on many categories of harms with which the law is 
concerned, such as physical injury‚ commercial fraud, and ecological damage. 
Our first psychological observation is that in law, as in ordinary life, people’s 
thinking is category-bound.  People do not easily cross the boundaries of 
categories3 of harms in their thinking.  When they consider an individual case of 
physical injury, or commercial fraud, the frame of reference for evaluation is 
usually a set of instances of the same kind of harm.4  When setting penalties for a 
category of cases, such as violations of regulations for occupational safety, 
regulators will naturally focus on instances that belong to that category.  They 
are much less likely to concern themselves with the consistency of their 
determinations with punishments for other categories of harmful conduct, such 
as damage to endangered species.  Yet, as we will show, simultaneous 
                                                           
2 Note that this is a test of coherence, not of social consensus, which was explored in Cass R. Sunstein, Daniel 
Kahneman & David Schkade, Assessing Punitive Damages, 107 Yale LJ 2071 (1998). But the absence of 
consensus on dollar amounts, discussed below, does bear on the possibility of achieving coherence. 
3 We say a few words below on the nature of categories. 
4 Daniel Kahneman and Dale Miller. Norm Theory: Comparing reality to its alternatives, 93 Psychological 
Review 136 (1986).   3
consideration of penalties for different kinds of infractions will often reveal that 
the more severe punishment was assigned to the misconduct which, in context, 
appears to be the less serious. 
 
A second significant source of incoherence is what we shall call the 
translation problem. By this term, we refer to the distinctive problem involved in 
translating a moral judgment of some kind5 into the terms made relevant by the 
legal system, such as monetary penalties, civil fines, or criminal punishment.6  
We argue that the act of translation causes serious problems, because it is 
grounded neither in agreed-upon principle nor in widely shared intuitions. Even 
when people show coherent and consistent moral intuitions, they may show little 
consistency and coherence in translating those intuitions into numbers, such as 
dollars of fines or years in jail. Because of the translation problem, coherence 
fails: there is no guarantee that the relative severity of punishments administered 
by the system will still appear sensible, just, or fair when several punishments 
are considered together.  The translation problem helps identify the cognitive 
foundations of current controversies over criminal sentencing, punitive damages, 
and contingent valuation. It affects the work not only of juries, but also of 
legislative and regulatory bodies that determine punishments for different kinds 
of misconduct within a particular category. The result, we will argue, is that the 
overall level of penalties set by different regulatory agencies may appear sensible 
when each set of regulations is considered on its own, but fail our test of 
coherence when several sets are considered at once. 
 
We consider it self-evident that if it exists, incoherence in punishments is a 
form of injustice. We shall also assume that when the public would not believe 
that outcomes fit sensibly together, this is a problem that calls for social response. 
We will assume that these points are correct, without defending them in any 
detail.  
 
The coherence and incoherence of punishments, both civil and criminal, 
will be the focus of our analysis, and in this domain we will attempt to show 
considerable reason for concern. Juries typically assess cases in isolation; in fact 
                                                           
5 We use this term because as a matter of fact, moral judgments appear to be the foundation of punishments. 
On the economic theory of punishment, optimal deterrence  is the goal, and optimal deterrence is in conflict 
with ordinary intuitions, as we discuss in detail below. A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, Punitive 
Damages:  An Economic Analysis, 111 Harv. L. Rev. 869, 870–76 (1998).For interesting reasons, the 
translation problem is not a serious one from the standpoint of economic analysis of law. We will refer to 
this point below. 
6 We initially discussed the translation problem, under the technical term “scaling without a modulus,”  in 
the particular context of punitive damage awards in Sunstein, et al., supra. We generalize the problem here.   4
lawyers are actually barred from referring to awards in other cases.  
Administrators, and congressional committees setting up penalties for regulatory 
misconduct, typically deal with one category of misconduct, and do not attend to 
problems of other types.7 Criminal sentences are established over time by 
different legislatures and legislative committees, with little effort to ensure a 
good fit of penalties to crimes across a broad  frame of reference.8  Because 
people are not inclined to consider the overall pattern – either because it is too 
difficult to do so or because it does not occur to them to try – the problem of 
incoherence does not naturally receive attention.9 As things now stand, the 
structure of those institutions charged with making regulatory and legislative 
decisions reinforces the effects of category-bound thinking.  Scandalously large 
inconsistencies can therefore persist indefinitely, in the absence of a special effort 
to impose coherence. 
 
The fact that coherence cannot be taken for granted has significant 
implications for institutional design. It suggests, in some domains, a possible 
reason to favor judicial decisions over jury decisions, because judges are more 
likely to have a menu of cases before them. Because judges are human,10 they too 
are susceptible to producing incoherent patterns11; but especially if the risk of 
incoherence is brought to judicial attention, they might well likely to do better, 
on this count, than juries. Our claims also suggest the potential value of 
“coherence commissions,” assigned the explicit mission to ensure that decisions 
fit together as an orderly whole, or at least to correct the most serious anomalies. 
We bring the idea of “coherence commissions” in contact with many areas of the 
law, including civil and criminal penalties, punitive damages, and valuation of 
statistical lives. We will also attempt to cast new light on some large topics in 
legal theory, including the aspiration to similar treatment of the similarly 
                                                           
7 Indeed, an administrator or regulator who shows explicit concern with problems that lie outside his or her 
jurisdiction risks being criticized as improperly “poaching” on someone else’s turf, or even having his 
decision held unlawful. See Pension Benefit Guaranty Corp. v. LTV Corp., 496 US 633 (1990) (allowing 
agency entrusted with pension guarantees not to consider other, relevant areas of law, and suggesting that 
any such consideration would violate the underlying statute). 
8 The goals of the United States Sentencing Commission are, on this dimension, quite unambitious. See 
below. In fact a version of the translation problem appears in the international domain, where criminal 
sentencing also shows a degree of incoherence. See Allison Marston Danner, Constructing a Hierarchy of 
Crimes in International Criminal Sentencing, Virginia Law Review (forthcoming 2001). 
9 Indeed we believe that this Article is the first to venture even a tentative assessment of the pattern of 
administrative penalties. See below. 
10 Chris Guthrie, Jeffrey Rachlinsk, Andrew Wistrich, Inside the Judicial Mind, 86 Corn. L. Rev. 778 (2001). 
11 This was an explicit rationale for the formulation of Sentencing Guidelines   5
situated, the twentieth-century movement toward bureaucracy,12 and the general 
problem of “incommensurability.” Discussing several different kinds of 
incoherence, we identify some of the cognitive limits of the aspiration to global 
coherence in law,13 while also pointing the way toward institutional reforms that 
could overcome those limits. We urge that “coherence commissions” could do a 
great deal to reduce existing injustice, in a way that would provide a twenty-first 
century analogue to important, but less ambitious, institutional developments in 
the twentieth century. 
 
B. Specific Points 
 
In this Article, we will be covering many topics, some of them in 
considerable detail. For purposes of exposition, it will be useful to give an 
overview of the specific claims that undergird our general arguments about 
incoherence 
 
•  The moral intuitions of the public are firmly retributive in character.14  
The intensity of what we shall call “punitive intention” – the desire to 
punish wrongdoing – is influenced both by the outrageousness of an 
action and by the severity of the harm that the action caused. 
 
•  It is extremely difficult for people to translate punitive intentions into 
the terms made relevant by the legal system, such as fines or prison 
terms. That task is not rooted in shared intuitions, moral or otherwise, 
and outcomes can be largely arbitrary and unpredictable.  Different 
juries may express the same punitive intention, but come up with quite 
different dollar awards. The bodies that set administrative 
punishments for particular categories of misconduct may differ widely 
in the general range of punishments that they choose, for no principled 
reason.  State legislatures may produce widely varying punishments 
for the same crime, not because of different moral judgments, but 
simply because of the translation problem. 
 
•  If people are asked to assess cases that fall within a particular category 
of actions and harms, but are not asked to translate their punitive 
                                                           
12 A helpful overview is Price Fishback & Shawn Kantor, A Prelude to the Welfare State: The Origins of 
Workers” Compensation (1999); see also Jerry Mashaw, Due Process in the Administrative State (1983), for a 
valuable discussion in the context of social security disability determinations. 
13 Associated with Ronald Dworkin, Law’s Empire (1985). 
14 As recognized by the Supreme Court in Cooper v Leatherman, 532 U.S. S. Ct. (2001) at footnotes 5 and 11.   6
intentions into dollars or years, people’s judgments tend to be both 
shared and coherent.15 It follows that if they are evaluating cases 
within each category, diverse people are likely to agree on how to rank 
a set of personal injury cases, business fraud cases, sexual harassment 
cases, or libel cases by their “punishable merit” (Justice Breyer’s term).  
 
•  When asked to evaluate a case separately and hence in isolation, 
people spontaneously proceed by comparing it against others falling 
within the same category.16 Thus, for example, people’s responses to a 
case of business fraud will be generated largely by comparing that case 
to other cases of business fraud. If the case of business fraud involves 
extremely egregious misconduct that caused very severe harm in this 
frame of reference, people will be extremely outraged.   The fact that 
there are other categories of cases, involving actions that people view 
as more evil and harms that they think more serious, will be effectively 
neglected. We call this effect “normalization.”17 
 
•  The requirement directly to compare cases drawn from different 
categories of harmful actions can cause large shifts in moral 
evaluations, punitive intentions and actual punishments, relative to the 
judgments of the same cases in isolation.  Such shifts, which we 
generically label judgment reversals, provide a diagnostic indication of 
a breakdown of coherence. 
 
•  There is less consensus on the ranking of cases in the hierarchy of 
“punishable merit”  when the cases involve different kinds of harms 
(e.g., personal injury vs. environmental damage) than when they 
belong to the same category.   Harms from different categories may 
seem “incommensurable,” because they cannot easily be described in 
terms of the same dimensions: the question of how many animals died, 
for example, is relevant in one of these situations but not in the other.  
The difficulty of comparisons across categories of harms may be one of 
the cognitive sources of the difficulty pointed out by Justice Breyer.  
 
                                                           
15 The claim is based on results reported by Daniel Kahneman, David Schkade & Cass R. Sunstein, Shared 
Outrage and Unpredictable Awards, 16 J. Risk & Uncertainty 49 (1998) and Sunstein et al., supra. 
16 See Kahneman & Miller, supra; see also Daniel Kahneman, Ilana Ritov & David Schkade.  Economic 
preferences or attitude expressions? An analysis of dollar responses to public issues, 19 Journal of Risk & 
Uncertainty  220 (1999).  
17 Id.   7
•  There is substantial consensus on the ranking of categories, including 
those created or used by the law. People agree, for example, that 
murder is worse than rape, than rape is worse than assault, and that 
assault is worse than libel. We suspect, however, that there is less 
social agreement on the ranking of categories than the on ranking of 
cases within categories.  
 
•  In spite of the difficulties of comparing categories of cases and cases 
across categories, there is in many cases sufficient consensus to permit 
a test of coherence, which examine whether judgments made in 
isolation are still retained when explicitly compared.  
 
We illustrate these claims by investigating judgments in several kinds of 
domains – some of them experimental, some involving actual government 
practice.  The first involves punitive damages awards. Here we show that people 
rank cases within a given category of harms in a consistent and coherent fashion, 
that their judgments about isolated cases are “normalized” according to the 
category in which they fall – but that these narrowly-based and easily-made 
judgments shift when people are compelled to consider the case in a broader 
context, by forcing a comparison to a case that involves harm of a different kind.  
The second kind of problem involves contingent valuation – an influential 
method of valuation by which people assign dollar values to goods that are not 
ordinarily traded on markets.18 We observe a similar pattern here.  The amount 
that the public will be willing to pay to prevent or correct some harm to a public 
good will be very different depending on whether the goods and the harms are 
viewed in isolation or in explicit comparison with harms to goods and harms 
from another category.19 This point fortifies existing doubts about the rationality 
and reliability of the contingent valuation method.20 
 
A third kind of problem involves administrative penalties. Investigating 
actual statutory practice, we find that such penalties tend to make a great deal of 
sense within categories, because (for example) the more serious occupational 
safety and health violations are penalized more severely than the less serious 
ones. At the same time, administrative practice seems to make little sense as a 
                                                           
18 See, e.g., George Tolley et al., Valuing Health For Policy (1995); Valuing Environmental Preferences  (Ian 
Bateman & K. G. Willis eds., 1999). 
19 See Julie Irwin, Paul Slovic, Sarah Lichtenstein & Gary McClelland, Preference reversals and the 
measurement of environmental values, 6 Journal of Risk & Uncertainty 5 (1993) 
20 See Peter Diamond & Jerry Hausman, Contingent Valuation: Is Some Number Better Than No Number, 8 
J. Econ. Persp. 45, 49-52 (1994); Note, Ask A Silly Question, 105 Harv L Rev 1981 (1992).   8
whole:  Once the practices of diverse agencies are put together, the area appears 
pervaded by cross-category anomalies. What requires explanation here is both 
how such anomalies arise and why they persist. We argue that the anomalies 
arise from the combined effects of category-bound thinking and the arbitrary 
nature of the translation of moral judgments into punishments.  The anomalies 
persist because of the absence of a strong need, at the individual and social 
levels, to ensure coherence. Apparently no constituency is seeking to ensure that 
the system of penalties fit together as a whole. In fact we believe that ours is the 
first effort even to explore the question of coherence in civil penalties – a point 
that attests to the fact that people can live (perhaps in ignorant bliss) with 
patterns that make little general sense. Here as well, underlying sources of the 
difficulty are category-bound judgments and the translation problem. The result 
is injustice and arbitrariness.  
 
While emphasizing the problem of incoherence, we do not suggest that 
coherence is sufficient to produce good outcomes.  Systems that are internally 
coherent can and should be criticized on independent grounds.21 It is also 
possible to insist that in some domains, the price of coherence is too steep, 
perhaps because of the administrative costs of achieving it, perhaps because 
coherence can be achieved only by altering some institutions, outcomes, and 
judgments that, on independent normative grounds, turn out to be good. But 
incoherence of the sort documented here is at the very least a serious problem, 
because it ensures a set of results that would widely be seen as indefensible and 
arbitrary. One of our largest goals is to uncover the mechanism that helps to 
produce this state of affairs, and to see what might be done about it.  
 
C. Plans 
 
This Article is organized as follows. Part II provides some general 
background on the concept of coherence. Part III explores the psychology 
underlying the forms of incoherence that is our focus here. Part IV turns to the 
basic cases of punitive damages and contingent valuation, offering experimental 
evidence of judgment reversals. In order to provide a focus for normative work 
on incoherence in law, Part V discusses the implications of our findings for 
punitive damages awards. Part VI explores more general implications by 
showing patterns of administrative penalties that most reasonable people would 
                                                           
21 See Joseph Raz, The Relevance of Coherence, in Ethics in the Public Domain 261 (1994).  Raz emphasizes 
that “Coherence  conveys a specific good, the value of which is undeniable. What is incoherence is 
unintelligible, because it is self-contradictory, fragmented, disjointed.” Id. at 264. Raz raises serious doubts 
about coherence  theories in id. at 265-70; we do not investigate the resulting complexities here.   9
reject as absurdly inconsistent, and that nevertheless persist indefinitely, 
reflecting the pervasive indifference to issues of global coherence that we have 
attributed to human cognition.   
 
Our basic purpose is descriptive, but we also contend that at a minimum, 
we have uncovered a serious problem, one that infects judgments and penalties 
in many areas of the law. While emphasizing the difficulty of achieving 
agreement on the requirements of full coherence, we suggest that many steps can 
be taken to correct the worst anomalies. In Part VII, we urge that as an ideal, the 
legal system should attempt to create institutions that would create more in the 
way of systemic rationality, and that where results do not fit, there is likely to be 
a problem of injustice. With respect to the budget, the Office of Management and 
Budget was originally created on just this ground, and the Sentencing Guidelines 
had similar aspirations (as yet unrealized, partly because of the absence of 
explicit cross-category comparisons). With respect to regulation, there are some 
related problems: the existence of large and apparently inexplicable disparities in 
expenditures per life saved is, in part, testimony to the absence of sustained 
cross-category comparisons. Of course the jury system raises special problems 
and concerns, and there are large questions about the extent to which reforms, 
even dramatic ones, might overcome the problems stressed here.  
 
In Part VIII, we show that our analysis bears on some larger issues in legal 
theory, including the debate over the value and possibility of coherence in law 
and the nature and existence of “incommensurability.” A main theme is that any 
effort to proceed “one case at a time” will produce serious problems, because of 
identifiable features of human cognition. We also attempt to show the cognitive 
basis for the experience of incommensurability. Our closing plea is for 
institutional changes designed to overcome the problems we identify, replacing 
predictably incoherent judgments with reforms whose goal is to produce 
systemic rationality. 
 
II. Coherence in General 
 
Our emphasis here will be on the particular types of incoherence that stem 
from the human tendency to make category-bound judgments, and from the 
arbitrariness of the translation of punitive intent into actual punishments. But 
this type of incoherence should be understood against a more general 
background, formed by the broader interest in coherence as a goal and by a 
continuing debate within economics and other social sciences.   10
Ethical and political philosophers have often viewed inconsistencies with 
concern,22 treating them as local warps in a web of beliefs that must be repaired 
by adequate reflection, in which specific beliefs are brought in line with each 
other and with broader principles.23 The search for “reflective equilibrium” is 
designed to ensure that one’s beliefs, at multiple levels of abstraction, fit together 
as a sensible whole.24 There is a similar aspiration to coherence within law,25 
though a decentralized system, with numerous judges, may well have special 
difficulty in achieving that goal.26 Our central findings here will show some new 
difficulties with efforts to achieve anything corresponding to reflective 
equilibrium within the legal system, or even in moral judgments. 
 
“Rational agent” theories in social sciences, and much important 
theorizing in the domain of law, rest on the assumption that human agents are 
endowed with coherent systems of beliefs and preferences, and define coherence 
as the principal criterion of rationality.27  An influential definition of rationality 
avoids any normative evaluation of the specific contents of beliefs and choices, 
and refers neither to the truth of beliefs nor to the consequences of choices.28  
Only internal consistency matters.29 In modern economic thinking, and in the 
economic analysis of law in particular, coherence is considered a touchstone of 
rationality.30  The preferences of the idealized rational agent provide a coherent 
ordering of possible states of affairs, and the beliefs of that agent permit an 
ordering of events by their probabilities.31  Furthermore, the dispositions to form 
new beliefs in the light of evidence, or to make choices when new options are 
offered, are also assumed to belong to the same coherent structure.32  
 
Doubts about the possibility of achieving incoherence lie at the core of a 
continuing debate about the “rationality” of human agents, involving 
                                                           
22 See Joseph Raz, The Relevance of Coherence, in Ethics in the Public Domain 261-278 (1994). 
23 See Gilbert Harmon, Change in View (1986); David Brink, Moral Realism and the Foundations of Ethics 
(1989); Germain Grisez et al., Practical Principles, Moral Truth, and Ultimate Ends, 32 Am J. Jurisprudence  
231 (1987). 
24 See John Rawls, A Theory of Justice 19-22, 46-51 (1971). 
25 See Dworkin, supra note. 
26 See Cass R. Sunstein, Legal Reasoning and Political Conflict 48-52 (1996). 
27 For overviews, see Rational Choice (Jon Elster ed. 1994); Gary Becker, Accounting for Tastes (1996); 
Richard A. Posner, Economic Analysis of Law ch. 1 (5th ed 1999). 
28 See John Von Neumann & Oscar Morgenstern, Theory of Games and Economic Behavior (2d ed. 1947). 
29For an outline and critique, see Amartya Sen, Internal Consistency of Choice, 61 Econometrica  495  (1993). 
30 See Von Neumann & Morgenstern, supra. In law, see Richard A. Posner, Economic Analysis of Law ch. 1 
(5th ed. 1999). 
31 See Gary Becker, Accounting for Tastes ch. 1 (1999); Leonard J. Savage, The Foundations of Statistics. 
(1954). 
32 See id.   11
economists, decision theorists, and psychologists, as well as philosophers and 
academic lawyers.33 It is now well-known that people are not in fact perfectly 
rational.34  They are better described, in Herbert Simon’s phrase, as boundedly 
rational.35  Bounded rationality has both cognitive and motivational aspects.36 
Because of the limitations in their ability to process information, boundedly 
rational agents are not able to maintain a system of beliefs, preferences, and 
dispositions that is both comprehensive and internally coherent.  At best, such 
agents are locally coherent -- achieving consistency over small regions of the 
space of possible events and outcomes, but not between more remote regions.  
Furthermore, boundedly rational agents are also cognitive misers -- they 
economize on difficult thinking and are not inclined to search for inconsistencies 
among their ideas, or even to acknowledge inconsistencies, unless they are 
pressured to do so.  In particular, we will develop the claim that people 
effortlessly achieve local coherence in their rankings  of actions and outcomes, 
but show limited ability and little interest in global coherence.  Hence global 
incoherence can persist for long periods. 
 
As a practical matter, complete consistency of beliefs and preferences is an 
unattainable ideal for any individual, and probably for any legal system.  
Failures of consistency are inevitable, but some are easier to avoid than others.  
People are normally successful at avoiding immediate inconsistencies between 
statements they make in the same setting, but it is much harder to prevent 
remote inconsistencies between a judgment one makes now and judgments 
made, or accepted in the past. It is  harder still to prevent situations in which a 
judgment that one makes now is inconsistent with a judgment that one would 
make if one were asked a different question (or the same question in different 
words). People who are unable to ensure that their current judgments are 
consistent with other judgments they accept, or with judgments they would 
make or would have made under different circumstances, inevitably produce a 
pattern of outcomes that they would themselves consider incoherent and 
indefensible. We will see this problem in many legal and policy domains. 
 
                                                           
33 See, e.g., Choices, Values, and Frames (Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky eds. 2000); The Rational 
Foundations of Economic Behavior (Kenneth Arrow et al. eds. 1996); Gerd Gigerenzer et al., Simple 
Heuristics That Make Us Smart (1999). 
34 For an overview, see Christine Jolls, Cass R. Sunstein & Richard Thaler, A Behavioral Approach to Law 
and Economics, 50 Stan L Rev 1471, 1476-1480 (1998). 
35 See Herbert A. Simon, A Behavioral Model of Rational Choice, 69 Q. J. Econ. 99 (1955). 
36 For an overview, see Jon Elster, Sour Grapes (1983).   12
III. Causes of Incoherence  
 
In this section we review in some detail the psychological underpinnings 
of the analysis to be presented in this Article.  Much of our treatment here is an 
effort both to extend and generalize our earlier empirical research on punitive 
damages37 and on contingent valuation,38 and more generally to build on 
previous theoretical and empirical analyses, not yet applied to law and policy, of 
intuitive judgment,39 attitudes and emotion,40 and spontaneous categorization.41 
We also offer two empirical results that we report for the first time here. The first 
is an experiment that demonstrates category-bound incoherence in judgments of 
punitive damages and in contingent valuation. The second is an examination of 
category-bound incoherence in administrative penalties. In this section, we 
explore the psychological mechanisms in some depth.  
 
Our previous studies indicated that the dollar numbers produced by 
jurors in civil cases involving punitive awards, and by respondents in contingent 
valuation surveys, can be interpreted as expressions of the intensity of a positive 
or negative attitude – an emotional evaluation of a defendant, or of a public 
issue.42  Specifically, we have argued that punitive damages are an expression of 
indignation or outrage on a scale of dollars, and we identified the problem of 
translating outrage onto that unfamiliar scale as a critical cause of 
unpredictability in punitive awards.  We extend this conception of punishment 
here, by adding that (i) reprehensible actions are naturally categorized, and (ii) 
outrage and its manifestations – including punitive damages – involve a process 
that situates any particular case in relation to its category.  We will show that this 
manifestation of category-bound thinking yields systematic incoherence in 
punitive intentions and in punitive awards.   
                                                           
37 Sunstein, Kahneman & Schkade, supra; Daniel Kahneman & Ilana Ritov, Determinants of stated 
willingness to pay for public goods: A study in the headline method. 9 Journal of Risk & Uncertainty  5 
(1994); Cass R. Sunstein,  David Schkade & Daniel Kahneman,  Do People Want Optimal Deterrence?   29 
Journal of Legal Studies 237 (2000); Kahneman, Schkade & Sunstein, supra; David Schkade, Cass R. Sunstein 
& Daniel Kahneman. Deliberating about dollars: The severity shift, 100 Columbia Law Review 101 (2000); 
Kahneman, Ritov & Schkade, supra. 
38 Kahneman & Ritov, supra.. 
39 Daniel Kahneman & Shane Frederick, Representativeness revisited: Attribute substitution in intuitive 
judgment, to appear in Heuristics of Intuitive Judgment: Extensions and Applications (Thomas Gilovich, 
Dale Griffin & Daniel Kahneman, eds, 2002). 
40 Kahneman, Ritov & Schkade, supra; Kahneman & Frederick, supra;  Paul Slovic et al., The Affect Heuristic 
to appear in Heuristics of Intuitive Judgment: Extensions and Applications (Thomas Gilovich, Dale Griffin & 
Daniel Kahneman, eds, 2002). 
41 Kahneman & Miller, supra. 
42 We intend to take no stand on the relationship between emotion and cognition. See Jon Elster, Alchemies 
of Mind (1999); Martha Nussbaum, Upheavals of Thought (2001).   13
 
We also extend the same analysis of punishment to a task that at first 
glance seems to involve little emotion: the setting of penalties by legislative or 
administrative bodies.  The leap is not as radical as it may appear at first.  We 
argue that members of a society are in wide agreement on the categorization of 
reprehensible actions, and on the relative outrageousness of actions within any 
one category.  Individuals and commissions that set penalties are likely to respect 
this ordering both for psychological reasons – it corresponds to their moral 
intuitions as well as to the intuitions of the public – and for political reasons: 
setting punishments that transparently violate the common ranking of 
“punishable merit” within a category will appear unjust and evoke resistance.  In 
this situation as well, we argue, category-bound thinking and the problem of 
translating punitive intent into dollars or other penalties combine to produce 
global incoherence. 
 
A. Punitive Intent: Determinants and Expressions 
 
We divide the task of setting punishment into two parts: 
 
1.  the determination of punitive intent, understood as the desire to punish, 
which locates the appropriate punishment on a subjective scale that 
ranges from “no punishment at all” to “extremely severe punishment.” 
 
2. the translation of punitive intent into a metric that can actually be used by 
the legal system, such as dollars of fine or years in jail.  
 
As we shall show, some forms of incoherence arise at the level of punitive 
intent, while others are caused by features of the translation process. 
 
Social psychologists commonly identify an emotion and a tendency to 
action as elements of  attitudes.43  In our usage, outrage is the emotion and 
punitive intent is the action tendency.  We believe that they are directly related.  
Outrage and punitive intent both are psychological variables – along with other 
subjective variables such as brightness, loudness, pain, trust and dislike.  Any 
subjective variable can be expressed in multiple ways.  For example, outrage may 
be expressed by appropriate adjectives, by the choice of a number on a rating 
scale, by loud screams, or by jail sentences.  
 
                                                           
43 Alice Eagly & Shelley Chaiken. The Psychology of Attitudes (1993).   14
The existence of something like a moral community is assumed in the 
analysis that follows.  When we speak of the outrageousness of an action or the 
punitive intention that is evoked by it, we have in mind an emotional state and a 
tendency to act that are widely shared in a relevant community.  Consensus in 
moral attitudes was demonstrated in an earlier study44 in which respondents 
(drawn from jury-eligible citizens in Travis County, Texas) were asked to 
evaluate product liability cases involving physical injuries.  Different groups of 
respondents used different scales in these evaluations.  Some evaluated the 
outrageousness of the defendant’s behavior (always a firm, also identified by 
annual profit as an indication of its size) using a rating scale (from “Completely 
Acceptable” to “Absolutely Outrageous”); others rated their punitive intent, also 
on a rating scale (from “No Punishment” to “Extremely Severe Punishment”). A 
third group assessed the appropriate amount of punitive damages, in dollars.  
 
We found substantial consensus in these judgments. Thus, on average, 
rich and poor; educated and less educated; white, Hispanic, and African-
American; old and young; male and female; and all others are likely to agree on 
how to rank and rate a set of personal injury cases in terms of their “punishable 
merit,”45 the outrageousness of the defendant’s conduct, and the punitive 
damages that are appropriate.46  Note that the agreement is between the average  
judgments for the various social groups.  There is some variability in judgments 
of each case within each group, and especially for judgments made in dollars.  In 
general, however, people appear to agree on what makes one personal injury 
worse than another (e.g., amount and duration of pain, disability, vulnerability 
of victims such as the elderly and the very young); they also agree on elements of 
the defendant’s behavior (e.g., intentionality, deception) that make one 
reprehensible action worse than another; and they agree as well on the severity 
of the harm inflicted on the plaintiff – provided that comparisons are restricted to 
harms of a particular type, such as physical injury.  . 
 
An analysis of the results of our study showed that the punitive awards 
assessed for 28 separate scenarios was predicted quite accurately by a very 
simple formula, which captures the psychological conception of punishment that 
we apply and extend in this article47: 
                                                           
44 The results are reported in Sunstein, Kahneman & Schkade, supra note, and in Kahneman, Schkade & 
Sunstein, supra note. 
45 See Breyer, supra note 1. 
46 See Kahneman Schkade & Sunstein, supra; at 2099. Sunstein et al., supra. 
47 The results of this analysis were described by Kahneman & Frederick, supra.  The severity of the harm 
associated with each of the scenarios used by Kahneman, Schkade & Sunstein, supra was rated by a small 
group of Princeton students, who were not given any details about the cause of the harm.   15
 
Punishment ($)     =  Outrageousness  X  Severity  X  Translation  
  of Behavior    of Harm    factor 
 
What this formula says is that punitive intent is proportional to the 
outrageousness of the harmful action, and that punitive intent is also 
proportional to the severity of the harm.  The translation factor is required to 
transform punitive intent – here construed as a state of mind – into actual 
punishments. 
  
  Punitive intent, as this formula indicates, is firmly retributive, in the sense 
that both the act and its consequences matter.48 Because of the retributive nature 
of the underlying intuitions, the public sense of what is just punishment is 
radically at odds with the idea, popular in some academic circles, that 
punishment should be grounded largely in its deterrent function, and therefore 
directly linked to the likelihood that an act will be discovered and punished.49  
Punishments that appear just in this society are based on outrage directed at the 
action and concern with the degree of harm that the action caused.50  
 
B. The Translation Problem 
 
We have described punitive intent as a state of mind – a sense that it is 
right for a miscreant to suffer some degree of pain.  Punitive intent can be 
expressed in words, such as “severe” or “mild.”  To have an effect in the real 
world, however, the intention to punish must be translated onto a scale that can 
be used by the legal system, such as dollars of fine or months in jail.  The 
translation factor in the formula above represents this operation of scaling.   
 
For many classes of harms, people lack shared moral intuitions that might 
specify the translation factor. Except to the extent that they are familiar with 
existing practice, people do not have a clear, agreed-upon sense that a grossly 
reckless action should be punished with a punitive award of $50,000, or $100,000, 
                                                           
48  Jonathan Baron & Ilana Ritov, Intuitions about penalties and compensation in the context of tort law, 7 
Journal of Risk & Uncertainty 17 (1993). 
49 Sunstein, Schkade & Kahneman, supra, reported that probability of detection, which is central to the law 
and economics analysis of deterrence, is largely irrelevant to intuitions about just punishment.  Punishment 
that is deliberately calibrated by probability of detection is considered unjust, when it results in similar 
actions being punished differently in different localities.  Baron &  Ritov, supra,  report that known and 
explicitly specified future impact of decisions do not substantially affect judgment, even of experts, although 
regulating future behavior is a critical factor in the theory of law and economics. 
50 See the acknowledgment of this point in Cooper v Leatherman, supra.    16
or $1,000,000, or that a case of assault should be punished with a jail term of six 
months, two years, or five years. As a consequence, the translation factor that is 
used is often influenced by irrelevant considerations, personal experience, and 
random circumstances. In the case of punitive damage awards, for example, the 
plaintiff’s demand matters a great deal, simply because juries often have few 
other relevant dollar figures from which to begin.51 And because of the influence 
of these irrelevant considerations and random circumstances, actual 
punishments for transgressions are often incoherent in our sense. That is, 
different juries, who agree on punitive intent for a given set of case facts, may 
impose substantially different punishments solely because of arbitrary 
differences in their translation factors. These propositions have direct 
implications for a wide range of tasks relevant to the law.  They apply with equal 
force to the determination of punishment for individual cases, and to the writing 
of statutes or regulations that specify punishments for particular transgressions.  
 
   Optimal deterrence theory offers a way of calculating the appropriate 
punishments, again by connecting dollars awards to the harm through the 
translation factor of “likelihood of compensation.”52  But we have already seen 
that this analysis violates common intuitions about just punishment.53  For those 
who seek to come up with dollar amounts that are intuitively appealing, a main 
difficulty is that harm and punishment do not generally occur in the same or 
even in commensurable units  What is the appropriate fine for hunting an 
endangered bird? $50? $500? $5000? Should the punitive damages for a case of 
employment discrimination be set at three times the value of compensatory 
damages, or at fifteen times that value?   
 
In an earlier analysis of punitive damages we focused on the arbitrariness 
of translation factors as a major cause of the notorious unpredictability of 
punitive damage awards.54 We expected, and found, large variation in the 
                                                           
51 Reid Hastie, David Schkade & John Payne. Juror judgments in civil cases: Effects of plaintiff’s request and 
plaintiffs identity on punitive damage awards, 23 Law & Human Behavior 445 (1999); also Gretchen B. 
Chapman & Brian H. Bornstein, The more you ask for, the more you get: Anchoring in personal injury 
verdicts, 10 Applied Cognitive Psychology 519 (1996) (finding similar effects for plaintiffs’ demand in the 
context of compensatory awards for personal injury). 
52 See A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, Punitive Damages:  An Economic Analysis, 111 Harv. L. Rev. 
869, 870–76 (1998). 
53 See Sunstein, Schkade & Kahneman, supra. Indeed, the Supreme Court has acknowledged that punitive 
awards are not rooted in deterrent judgments. See Cooper v Leatherman, supra. 
54 Kahneman, Schkade & Sunstein, supra at 2106-07. We described the juror’s task as a special case of scaling 
without a modulus. The term is borrowed from psychological experiments in which observers use numbers 
to indicate the intensity of sensations such as brightness, loudness or pain. The common practice in such 
scaling experiments is to specify a particular stimulus (e.g., a level of luminance) as a standard.  Observers   17
translation factor that people will apply in judging a particular case, even when 
their punitive intent is the same.  In subsequent research we found that jury 
deliberations are not a cure for the variability of translation factors.55  The general 
effect of deliberation was instead a severity shift:  it appears that when jurors start 
off with different translation factors, higher punishments that are proposed in 
the deliberation are more likely to be adopted, and are sometimes even exceeded 
by the jury’s award. Even after deliberation, different mock juries considering the 
same case often reach radically different decisions – punitive damage awards 
sometimes vary by a factor of 100 or more.56 
 
 It is easy to see that free-floating translation factors will often cause 
failures of our test of coherence. Imagine two juries that consider separate claims 
A and B against the same defendant, awarding $1 million for case A and $5 
million for case B.  Because the translation factor that they apply may be 
different, it is entirely possible that both juries, if asked to compare the two cases, 
would agree that case A is higher in “punishable merit” than case B.  The 
inevitable consequence of variability in the translation factor is incoherence in 
punishments: different individuals and different juries will make judgments that 
cannot be reconciled, even in the presence of underlying consensus on punitive 
intent.  
 
We do not intend to imply that the translation factors that people apply 
are completely arbitrary.  Indeed, data that we have reported demonstrate the 
opposite.  In one  of our earlier studies57 of punitive damages each case was 
presented in two versions which differed only in the annual profits of the 
defendant firm. For example this value was “$10-20 million” in one version and 
“$100-200 million” in another. The indication of the size of the defendant firm 
had a large and systematic effect on punitive awards, which were substantially 
higher for larger firms.  The mechanism that produces this effect is most likely 
                                                                                                                                                                             
are instructed to assign a particular number (the modulus) to that stimulus, and to assign numbers to other 
stimuli by comparing them to the subjective intensity associated with the standard. The task may appear 
meaningless, but in fact it is one that people can carry out with fair agreement – much like the consensus 
they exhibit in judging the severity of harms or the outrageousness of behaviors.  In some experiments, 
however, a modulus is not supplied, and the observers are requested to assign whatever numbers they feel 
appropriate to report the subjective intensity of their sensations.  In such situations of scaling without a 
modulus, observers spontaneously adopt their own individual standard and apply it consistently.  
However, different observers choose different moduli for no apparent reason.  Thus, two stimuli may be 
rated as 10 and 2 by one individual, and as 40 and 8 by another, simply because the second individual 
picked a modulus that is 5 times larger than the first. 
55 See Schkade, Sunstein & Kahneman, supra. 
56 Id. at Table 5 
57 Kahneman, Schkade & Sunstein, supra.   18
the same that produces anchoring of awards on irrelevant factors.  In this 
instance, however, the effect of firm size on awards corresponds to the sensible 
intuition that a larger financial punishment is required to inflict the same level of 
“pain” if the defendant firm is large than if it is small.  Other anchoring effects 
could be defended as well: punitive awards have been found to be strongly 
correlated with compensatory awards in the same case,58 and perhaps anchoring 
of punitive on compensatory awards could be justified as appropriate, though 
this would not be an easy task.59 
 
C. Categories and Frames of Reference 
 
In this Article we study two manifestations of category-bound thinking that 
produce incoherence in punishments: (1) the frame of reference for judging 
harmful actions is linked to a category of harms, and therefore liable to change 
when cases that involve harms of different kinds are explicitly compared; (2) the 
commissions that set penalties for categories of misconduct appear to be 
unconcerned with the penalties already on the books for other categories.  In 
both situations, we suggest that judgments are sensible and coherent within each 
category separately, but not when the view screen is expanded to include more 
than one category. To understand this suggestion, and the mechanisms that 
produce judgment reversals, it is necessary to know something about what 
categories are and how they operate. 
 
The term “category,” as used in this Article, is borrowed from modern 
cognitive science, where it serves to explain how people use categories and 
category labels in informal reasoning and in everyday language. 60  This concept 
of categories and categorization is quite different from an approach in which a 
category is defined by a set of necessary and sufficient conditions for 
membership. In that system, the boundary between categories are sharp and 
membership is all-or-none.  In everyday language, in contrast, the boundaries of 
categories are fuzzy and membership is graded. 61  A chicken is surely a bird, but 
is not quite as good a bird as a robin, or an eagle.  And a whale is not a fish, but it 
                                                           
58 Theodore Eisenberg et al., The Predictability of Punitive Damages, 26 J. Legal Stud. 623, 644 (1997). 
59 It would not be easy on any theory of punitive damages. On optimal deterrence theory, a key issue is the 
multiplier; the compensatory award is in some sense an anchor, but a weak one, because a 100% likelihood 
of compensation should produce  a punitive award of 0, an a 10% likelihood of compensation should 
produce a punitive award ten times that of the compensatory award.  On the retributive view, there is no 
obvious translation formula.  
60 See, e.g., Daniel Reisberg, Cognition: Exploring the Science of Mind (1997), ch. 8; Laurence Barsalou, 
Cognitive Psychology: An Overview for Cognitive Scientists (1992).  
61 Eleanor Rosch et al., Basic Objects in Natural Categories, 8 Cognitive Psychology 382 (1976).   19
is a bird even less.  Indeed, the habit of thinking in terms of fuzzy categories and 
graded membership is so deeply ingrained that it explains the documented 
difficulties of juries in conforming to judges” instructions about verdicts that are 
defined by necessary and sufficient conditions.62 Of course, no one would wish to 
claim that people are incapable of thinking in terms of necessary and sufficient 
conditions for category membership.  This mode of thinking is dominant in 
mathematics and in scientific reasoning, and at least implicitly in some domains 
of law as well; consider the question of whether speech can be regulated as 
"obscene.”63  
 
Any object or event is a member of innumerable categories (for example, 
the category of things that are not Julius Caesar). But questions that require a 
judgment reveal that categorization follows rules that are widely shared and 
quite predictable.  Consider the questions “is an eagle large?” and “is a cabin 
small?”  The expected answer to both questions, when separately presented, is 
“yes.”  The categories of birds and buildings were not mentioned in the 
questions, but they are evoked in the respondent’s mind, and they are 
automatically used to provide a frame of reference for the otherwise ambiguous 
question about the objects’ size.  We will say that the judgments are 
spontaneously normalized to the frame of reference implied by the category. 
 
There are situations in which a judgment can be normalized to a category 
that is not associated with a definite category label.  Consider the following 
example: “John is a six-year old child whose pajamas caught fire as he was 
playing with matches.  The boy was badly burned over a significant portion of 
his body and required several weeks in hospital and months of physical therapy.  
How would you describe the harm that was caused in this incident? Extremely 
severe?  Severe? Mild?”  At first glance, this question may appear impossible to 
answer without specifying a frame of reference.  Remarkably, most people do not 
find this task meaningless or even particularly difficult.  They will readily 
generate judgments that will cluster around “very severe.”  Evidently, people 
evaluate a case as mild or severe relative to an ad hoc frame of reference, which 
consists of similar examples that spontaneously come to mind.  In the case at 
hand, we suspect that the categories that people construct correspond fairly 
closely to the class of “injuries that occur in household accidents,” and we also 
suspect that they do not explicitly label the category as such. 
                                                           
62 For an example with punitive damage instructions, see Reid Hastie, David Schkade & John Payne, A 
study of juror and jury judgments in civil cases: Deciding liability for punitive damages, 22 Law & Human 
Behavior 287 (1998). 
63 See the definition of obscenity in Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973).   20
The judgments that people make without a specified frame of reference 
are nevertheless quite orderly.  A story about an elderly woman who slipped in a 
bathtub and sprained her ankle will elicit substantially milder judgments.  
Furthermore, the fact that people generally agree closely in their judgments 
suggests that the informal categories that people construct around any given case 
are quite similar.  The boundaries of these informal categories are undoubtedly 
fuzzy, and they include cases that differ along many dimensions, such as the 
permanent loss of four fingers or several months of complete blindness. We can 
be certain, however, that other harms, such the destruction of a reputation, or a 
drop in the population of dolphins, will not come to mind when the case of the 
burned child is considered.  Similarly, cases of damage to reputations or to 
species will evoke their own frame of reference, which will not include personal 
injuries.  The meanings of words such as “mild” or “severe” will be normalized 
to each of these fuzzy categories.   
 
Normalization in the use of adjectives is a simple convention of language, 
which usually causes no serious problems of communication.  But there is a 
separate phenomenon, one of considerable importance to psychology and law: 
normalization is also found in emotional reactions, in punitive intentions, and in actual 
punishments. 64  Consider the behavior of a guest at a formal dinner who pushed 
his plate away in obvious distaste, while muttering a derogatory comment about 
the hostess. Casual observation suggests that intense emotions of indignation can 
be evoked by such rude behavior, not only in the victimized hosts but also in 
observers. The intensity of these feelings might well be greater than that created 
by actions such as misdeeds by public officials, which cause much graver harms 
but are normalized to a different category.  In an explicit comparison, of course, 
everyone will agree that something is inappropriate about reactions of outrage 
that are more intense for trivial misconduct than for genuine malfeasance.  The 
relativity of the emotion of outrage is important to our story about law, because 
we argue that outrage and punitive intent are closely linked in the moral 
attitudes of most people, and are directly expressed in actual punishments.65  As 
we now show, the normalization of outrage is a significant source of incoherent 
punishments.    
 
Recall the minimal criterion for coherence that we apply here: Is the 
ranking of two or more cases the same when they are directly compared and 
when they are judged in isolation?  Note that this criterion is likely to be met for 
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objects that belong to the same category.  Judged separately, burns over much of 
the body appear severe and a sprained ankle appears mild.  The ranking of the 
two harms will not change when the two cases are directly compared, because 
the frames of reference were the same to begin with. When harms of the same 
general kind are caused by misconduct, we expect outrage and punishments to 
pass the test of coherence.  Normalization occurs, but it does not produce 
incoherence. 
 
The risk of incoherence arises when the judgments made separately and in 
direct comparison involve different categories, and therefore different frames of 
reference.  First, comparisons across categories of harms are particularly difficult 
because they are not easily described in the same language.  To appreciate the 
difficulty, consider an action that led to one person losing four fingers and also to 
the death of 10,000 migratory birds.  The comparison of these harms involves 
complexities of a different order from within-category comparisons.  The 
difficulties of cross-category comparisons inevitably lead to instability in the 
judgments of individuals, and to an impairment of consensus, relative to within-
category comparisons.66 
 
What causes this more systematic form of incoherence? The reason is that 
comparison across categories introduces features that are relevant to the 
judgment, but not given adequate weight when cases are considered in 
isolation.67 We believe, without formal evidence, that there is substantial 
agreement on comparisons between categories in terms of a vaguely defined but 
well understood dimension sometimes called “prominence” in the psychological 
literature.68 For example, physical injury is more prominent than financial injury, 
and harm to people is more prominent than harm to other biological species. 
Because of normalization, the relative prominence of categories of harm plays no 
role when these harms are judged in isolation. But because the features that 
distinguish categories become very salient in a comparison, incoherence is an 
inevitable consequence69. We test this proposition in the experiment described 
below. 
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of punitive damage cases involving different types of harm. See Cass R. Sunstein, Daniel Kahneman, David 
Schkade & Ilana Ritov, Legal Coherence and Incoherence (unpublished draft 2000). 
67 Ilana Ritov, The Role of Expectations in Comparisons, 107 Psychological Review 345 (2000). 
68 Amos Tversky, Shmuel Sattath & Paul Slovic. Contingent weighting in judgment and choice. 95 
Psychological Review 371 (1988). 
69 Dedre Gentner & Arthur B. Markman, Structural alignment in comparison: no difference without 
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IV. A Study of Normalization and Incoherence 
 
To illustrate the judgment reversals produced by category-bound thinking 
and by the process of normalization, we consider two different evaluation tasks, 
involving punitive damage awards and  contingent valuation of public goods. 
Both punitive damage awards and contingent valuation have been highly 
controversial in recent years.70 We will present evidence of judgment reversals in 
each context.  
 
A.  Hypothesis and Design 
Our central question was whether people’s assessments would differ 
depending on whether they viewed a problem in isolation (separate evaluation) 
or in comparison to a problem from a different category (cross-category 
comparison). The problems we used are drawn from categories of harm that 
differ in prominence (physical injury vs. financial loss; harm to human beings vs. 
harm to the ecology71).  Our central hypothesis was that when a problem is 
viewed in isolation, judgments are normalized within the relevant category, but 
that this normalization is prevented when a comparison to a problem from a 
different category is required. Instead, differences between categories will 
dominate the consideration.  We therefore expected problems drawn from 
categories involving the worse type of harm to evoke higher judgments (larger 
punitive awards, higher willingness to pay) in comparative than in isolated 
evaluations.  
 
We asked a large group of people to consider pairs of legal cases and of 
public causes (see Table 1).72 Each pair of legal cases consisted of one case of 
physical injury and one case of financial loss.73 Each pair of public causes 
                                                                                                                                                                             
Robert L. Goldstone & Arthur B. Markman, Comparison and choice: Relations between similarity processes 
and decision processes, 2 Psychonomic Bulletin & Review 1 (1995). Ritov, supra.   
70 On punitive damages, see, e.g., Symposium, The Future of Punitive Damages, 1998 Wisc. L. Rev. 1; on 
contingent valuation, see, e.g., Symposium, Contingent Valuation, 8 J. Econ. Persp. 3 (1994). 
71 It might be objected here that everything depends on the degree of harm: a trivial physical injury is not as 
bad as a huge financial loss. We agree. We are suggesting only that the categories, as such, are ranked, and 
ranked in the way that we describe. 
72 Jury-eligible citizens from Travis County, Texas (n = 1,035) were recruited by a survey firm and paid for 
their participation. All respondents received detailed instructions about the task of jurors in civil cases and 
the criteria for punitive damages. 
73 Each case was a short summary (200 words) of a realistic incident, in which the defendant was always a 
large company described as having “annual profits of around $150 million.” Respondents were told to 
assume that $500,000 in compensatory damages had already been awarded to the plaintiff, and that the case   23
consisted of one threat to human health, and one threat to the environment.74  
Some people made their evaluations on a dollar scale and others on rating 
scales.75 
After evaluating one case and one cause in isolation, people saw the 
paired case and cause, which they were asked to compare to the one they had 
already seen (see Appendices A, B and C).  For example, for legal pair A, they 
were asked “Compared to the manufacturer of childproof safety caps, how much 
punishment does the company that sold repainted cars as new deserve?” and for 
Pair D of public causes “Compared to protecting coral reefs, how much money 
would you be willing to contribute to a fund for farm workers” skin cancer?”). 
After answering this question by circling “less than,” “more than” or ‘the same,” 
participants also evaluated the new item on the same scale they used in making 
judgments in isolation. 
                                                                                                                                                                             
had reached the stage of determining whether punitive damages were appropriate, and if so, in what 
amount. 
74 Each threat and a proposed mitigating intervention was described in a paragraph of text. Each person was 
randomly assigned to one legal pair and to one public cause pair. 
75 One third of the participants responded on rating scales and the other two thirds on dollar scales.  For the 
punitive damage cases, the rating scale was the appropriate severity of punishment, ranging from 0 (“no 
punishment”) to 8 (“extremely severe punishment”).  The dollar scale was the amount of punitive damages 
that the defendant should be required to pay.  For public causes, the rating scale was the satisfaction that 
individuals would derive from contributing to the cause, ranging from 0 (“no satisfaction at all”) to 6 
(“extreme satisfaction”).  The dollar scale was the maximum amount that they would be willing to 
contribute to the cause (denoted below as WTP – willingness to pay).   24
Table 1. Summary of Problems 
Legal Cases 
 
 Pair Physical  Harm Financial  Harm 
 
  A  Childproof safety cap fails;  Repainted cars sold as new 
    child needs hospital stay  to leasing agency 
 
  B  Patient injured when surgeon  Distributor violates contract, 
    ignores standard safety rules  damaging supplier’s 
business 
 
  C  Driver injured when defective  Trustee manipulates trust  
    steering system fails  to enrich a favored client  
 
 
Public Causes 
 
 Pair  Harm to Humans  Harm to the Environment 
 
  D  Program to improve detection   Fund to clean up and protect  
    of skin cancer in farm workers  dolphin breeding locations  
 
  E  Research on a type of bone   Fund to protect coral reefs 
    marrow cancer in the elderly  by banning cyanide fishing 
 
  F  Program to replace lead-based   Fund to protect elephants 
    paint in low-income areas  from ivory poachers 
 
 
B.  Findings 
The four panels of Figure 1 present our results, pooled over the three pairs 
of legal cases and public causes. The Figure shows unambiguous shifts of 
judgment, depending on whether a problem is viewed in isolation or in the 
context of a problem from a different category.  The pattern of shifts is just the 
one we predicted from a process of normalization: when cases from categories 
that differ in prominence are viewed in isolation, the effect of the category is 
suppressed.  As a result, the more prominent harm is assigned a lower rating and 
a lower dollar value when judged by itself than when directly compared to a 
harm of a less prominent kind.  The pattern of results is strikingly similar for 
ratings on bounded scales and for dollar responses.  It is also precisely the same   25
for responses to harms that are to be punished (civil suits) and for harms that are 
to be prevented or remedied (public causes).  
 
Figure 1.  Aggregate Evaluations over Cases or Causes for Rating  
and Dollar Responses 
 
 
 
Note also that when cases are compared across categories of harm, the 
evaluation of the more prominent item rises sharply, while that of the less 
prominent item declines slightly or stays about the same.76  The asymmetric 
                                                           
76 This pattern is confirmed by analysis – the interaction  of Evaluation Mode (SE vs CCC) and Item Type 
(e.g., financial vs personal injury) is evident and statistically significant in all four panels (each p <.001). 
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effects of the comparison on more and on less prominent harms reflects a 
cognitive phenomenon that is well understood, but not central to our story.77 
  Measured in dollars, the shifts illustrated in Figure 1 are quite substantial. 
Averaging over the three personal injury cases, the median dollar award rose 
from $1 million in separate evaluation to $2.25 million when they were directly 
compared to cases of financial harm. The median dollar award increased from 
separate to cross-category evaluation for all three personal injury cases. At the 
same time, the median award did not change significantly for any of the three 
financial cases. The shifts in willingness to pay – which in standard contingent 
valuation practice would be translated into estimates of the value of the goods – 
are also substantial. 
 
The similarity of results for ratings and dollar awards is particularly 
noteworthy.  As our discussion of eagles and cabins showed, category-bound 
shifts in the meaning of adjectives are expected as a convention of language.  But 
dollars, like centimeters, are objective units that are supposed to retain the same 
meaning across contexts.  An individual who said an eagle is large and a cabin is 
small has no cause for embarrassment, but an individual who estimates the size 
of eagles and cabins in metric units is supposed to make estimates that are 
absolute, not category-relative. (We would want to pose some questions to 
anyone who insists that eagles are really bigger than cabins.)  Likewise, jurors 
who assess punishments in dollars are supposed to use an absolute scale, and 
their judgments should not be different from those they would make in the 
context of a comparison with a different type of misconduct.  Similarly, the 
standard interpretation of stated willingness-to-pay as a measure of the value of 
public goods assumes that these statements provide an absolute measure of these 
goods, but the sensitivity of WTP to the judgment context casts doubt on this 
essential assumption. 
 
The similarity of the results for ratings and for dollar values also provides 
support for another claim we have made earlier about both punitive damages 
and contingent valuation.78  We have argued that punitive awards and 
                                                           
77 Psychological research indicates that comparison of two objects is not a symmetric process: one object (the 
subject) is compared to another (the referent).  In the present design, the problem presented in the first 
envelope was the referent to which the second item was compared.  Evidence from other studies indicates 
that the perceived contrast between two objects is greater when the more prominent of them is the topic of 
the comparison.  For example, China is more different from North Korea than North Korea is from China 
See Amos Tversky, Features of similarity, 84 Psychological Review 327 (1977). In the present instance, this 
process would cause a greater effect in making the more prominent harm look worse than in reducing the 
significance of the less prominent one. 
78 Kahneman, Ritov & Schkade, supra   27
statements of willingness to pay are direct expressions of an emotional response:  
outrage in the case of harm caused by one person to another, and the fear and 
hope associated with the possibility of preventing or undoing harm to people, or 
to aspects of the ecology.  But we have also added a crucial element here, which 
we infer from the shifts in dollar responses. Emotional responses, no less than the 
responses in dollars, are category-bound and context-dependent.  The emotion 
itself will vary, depending on whether a case or problem is considered in 
isolation or compared to a case or problem from a different category.  
 
C.  Some Speculations 
 
  The normalization effect that we documented in this study has other 
implications as well. In particular, the results suggest that the contingent 
valuation approach is likely to distort the relative willingness of the public to 
deal with threats to the environment and with threats to people, unless steps are 
taken to overcome the problems identified here. And if people’s informed 
judgments are taken to be the criterion, punitive damage awards are likely to be 
too high in financial injury cases and too low in personal injury cases. Some data 
supports this suggestion.79  We expect that similar shifts could be documented 
with many other pairs of categories.  For example, we suspect that punitive 
damages awards involving libel might well be higher, in isolation, than punitive 
damage awards involving racial discrimination; but there is likely to be a 
reversal if the two cases are put together.  
 
In the theory that we have proposed, normalization reduces the 
differences in the overall level of outrage that is evoked by misconduct that 
causes different kinds of harms.  The comparison of cases drawn from different 
categories restores differences between categories of harms that differ in 
prominence – this should be considered an improvement in the quality of 
judgment.  We hypothesize that the comparative situation may alter judgments 
in another way, by reducing the anchoring effects of compensatory damages on 
punitive awards.80  In the real world of punitive damages, unlike our experiment, 
compensatory awards are generally much larger in financial cases than in cases 
of physical injury.81 In this pair of categories, the anchoring effects favor large 
                                                           
79 See Jonathan Karpoff & John Lott, On the Determinants and Importance of Punitive Damage Awards, 42 J. 
Law and Ec. 527, 539 (1999). 
80 See Eisenberg, et al., supra.  Note that the function of an anchor is similar to the function of a modulus in 
psychophysical judgments.  See not supra.. 
81 See Karpoff & Lott, at 538-39, showing mean awards of $14.8 million in fraud cases, and $20.6 million in 
business negligence cases, but $6.2 million in product liability cases, $1.6 million in malpractice cases,  and 
$991,000 in motor vehicle accident cases.   28
judgments for the less prominent harm.  As a consequence, a case of financial 
damage with a large compensatory anchor (say $10,000,000) is expected to 
receive a higher punitive damage award than a case of physical injury with a 
smaller anchor (say $500,000), when the two are judged in isolation.  When cases 
of the two kinds are directly compared, we expect that many people will be more 
strongly influenced by the relative prominence of the harms than by the relative 
size of the anchors. Preliminary evidence82 that we have collected supports this 
hypothesis, which suggests that two distinct mechanisms may cause punitive 
awards for financial cases to be higher in the current system than they would be 
if jurors were given a richer context: anchoring on high dollar numbers, and 
masking of the low prominence of the category through the effect of 
normalization. 
 
 
V.  Punitive Damages: Is There A Problem? What Kind of Problem? 
 
If cross-category judgment reversals are likely to be pervasive (as we 
believe), the problem of predictable incoherence will appear in many contexts. In 
what follows, we speculate on the evidence of incoherence in punitive damages 
and on possible reforms that might address the problem. Our principal message 
is critical rather than constructive; we claim to have uncovered a serious 
problem, not to know how to solve it. Our aim is not to endorse a particular 
proposal, but to explore the implications of incoherence in moral intuitions for 
legal institutions.  
 
Most of what we say here will apply, with suitable variations, to the 
assessment of incoherence in other settings, such as contingent valuation, 
administrative penalties and fines. In Parts VI, VII, and VIII, we turn to some 
broader speculations. 
 
A. Can Coherence Be Achieved? 
 
We have observed that people's judgments about appropriate punitive 
awards are very different, depending on whether they see a case in isolation or in 
comparison to another case.  We also believe that most people, in most 
conditions, prefer a wide view screen to a narrow one, and will in principle 
(though not always in actual practice) have greater confidence in the judgments 
they make in a broad than in a narrow context. These points raise serious 
                                                           
82 See Cass R, Sunstein et al., Legal Coherence and Legal Judgment (unpublished manuscript 2001).   29
questions about the current system, and support a presumption against the 
outcomes of one-shot judgments, which occur by design in punitive damages 
cases.  Furthermore, they suggest a direction for reform. If the purpose of the 
institution of the jury is both to elicit the judgments of ordinary people and to 
satisfy their wish for justice, there is good reason to search for ways to prevent or 
correct outcomes that all or almost all would consider anomalous when placed in 
the context of the pattern as a whole. More ambitiously, we might seek ways of 
ensuring judgments that fit into a pattern that ordinary people would find 
coherent. The achievement of global coherence is exceedingly difficult, but it has 
considerable appeal, at least as an ideal.  
 
But any effort to achieve this ideal is open to three major objections. The 
most basic is that there is good reason to doubt the very existence of an 
underlying system of moral intuitions that is internally consistent.  Recent 
behavioral studies of human decision making have undermined the hope that 
people’s choices can be explained in terms of a comprehensive and coherent 
‘preference order’.83  The evidence suggests that people construct preferences on 
the fly, and that their choices are highly dependent on the immediate context and 
on inconsequential features of the options they consider.  Of course, choices are 
not chaotic or random – the decisions that people make have some consistency 
and structure, but this structure is better described by the loose logic of attitude 
than by the coherent logic of fully rational preferences.84  This argument extends 
directly to moral choices, moral preferences and moral intuitions – raising doubts 
about the feasibility of reflective equilibrium in this domain.85    
 
Even if the moral intuitions and sentiments of individuals could be 
rationalized, there would be a question about the feasibility of a coherent system 
that is broadly acceptable across society.  We have already mentioned the 
hypothesis that social and cultural groups may differ more in their ranking of 
categories of harm than in their rankings of harms within each category.86  
Obviously, serious problems will be encountered in attempting to achieve 
agreement on a system of punishments that incorporates the judgments of 
different individuals and groups about all categories – recall the epigraph from 
Justice Breyer. 
                                                           
83 See Kahneman and Tversky, 2000 for multiple sources on this point. 
84 Kahneman, Ritov & Schkade, 1999. 
85 Daniel Kahneman, Unpublished Tanner Lecture, University of Michigan (1994). 
86 For example, members of minority groups may rank racial discrimination as more important than 
members of the majority, stockholders may rank securities fraud as more important than non-stockholders, 
etc.   30
 
The third objection is that even if the moral intuitions of ordinary people 
could be represented as a broadly acceptable and coherent system, it might be 
wrong to adopt this system as the final arbiter of issues in law in general, and of 
judgments of punitive damages in particular.  As we have seen, there is 
compelling evidence that the popular conception of justice is more concerned 
with issues of retribution than with issues of deterrence.87 Those who accept the 
dominant approach in law and economics, where deterrence is the principal goal 
of punitive damages,88 are likely to reject any system in which the probability of 
detection plays little or no role in the setting of such damages.  On the other 
hand, of course, there is reason to believe that a system of punishments that is 
exclusively concerned with deterrence will be considered unjust by the public.  
 
Finally, if these all these fundamental objections could be met, issues of 
feasibility would arise.  Even if an underlying and comprehensive system of 
intuitions exists, the methods of uncovering it do not.  There is a limit to the 
complexity of cognitive tasks that ordinary people can be asked to do, and 
ranking the punishable merit of different kinds of misconduct that cause 
different kinds of harms clearly exceeds these limits.  Furthermore, the 
construction of instruments for eliciting these judgments would inevitably be 
questioned for possible bias and other flaws of method. 
 
Thus, the ideal of seeking a system that is both coherent and reflective of 
popular moral sentiments can be questioned on both normative and practical 
grounds.  Nevertheless, we submit that incoherence, once acknowledged, is 
unacceptable, even scandalous. Something should be done about it.  We next 
consider some of the things that may be done. Our emphasis is on finding ways 
to correct obvious errors, which is a realistic goal, rather than to produce what all 
would agree to be coherent, a goal that seems, in light of what we have just said, 
to be unduly ambitious.  
 
B. Reforms 
 
  Consider the following reform possibilities: (a) asking the jury to look at 
cases from more than one category of harms; (b) increasing judicial control over 
awards, on the theory that judges are likely to have an implicit comparison set in 
view, and could be required to make explicit comparisons; and (c) transferring 
                                                           
87 See Sunstein, Schkade & Kahneman, supra 
88 See note supra.   31
some or all of the relevant tasks to a bureaucracy, which might create and 
operate a kind of "damage schedule" for conduct calling for punitive awards of 
some kind.    
 
1. Comparisons before the jury. It is tempting to think that the best response 
to what we have shown is simply to provide jurors with information about cases 
in more than one category of harms, so as to overcome the global incoherence 
that results from isolated judgments. But a moment’s reflection should suffice to 
show that this is not a sensible solution.  
 
The first problem involves cognitive overload. Would specific cases be 
shown to the jury? From which categories? In what detail? Obviously it would be 
absurd to provide jurors with all cases from all categories. But any small set of 
comparison cases would seem, and inevitably be, arbitrary. The second problem 
involves the risk of manipulation. It would be easy, on the basis of our findings 
here, to select a category that would drive up both outrage and dollar awards, or 
to drive them down. A lack of a comparative context is indeed a problem, but 
comparisons before the jury are not a realistic response. 
 
2. Increased judicial control: additur, remittitur, and others. A more promising 
strategy for reducing incoherence would be to give relatively greater power to 
the reviewing court and relatively less power to the jury.  The basic idea would 
be that judges are in a better position to move toward global coherence, or at 
least to avoid the worst anomalies. To be sure, we have said that people are not 
likely to agree about what pattern of results would really represent "global 
coherence," and it is possible that judges” views would diverge from those of 
juries or the public at large. All we are suggesting is that a greater role for judges 
could produce progress by everyone’s lights, if the basic goal is to avoid the most 
serious misjudgments.  
 
A tempting motivation for this reform would be that by virtue of their 
experience,  judges have a larger implicit comparison set. Having seen a wide 
range of cases, judges might seem likely to know that a punitive damage 
judgment of, say, $400 million for commercial fraud, or $50,000 for pain and 
suffering associated with an eight-month hospital stay produced by reckless 
behavior, is extremely odd when compared to cases falling in other categories. 
Indeed, the old practice of remittitur, allowing judges to reduce excessive 
awards, can be understood as an effort to ensure more in the way of global 
coherence. But there is reason to think that implicit comparison sets are not   32
enough, and that because judges are human,89 steps must be taken to counteract 
the natural tendency to make category-bound judgments. For the process to 
work, judges must be required to make such comparisons; left to their own 
devices, they might not do so, or make comparisons only to an idiosyncratic or 
ad hoc set of cases. In fact courts have expressly suggested that appellate review 
of awards should be conducted by examining comparison cases, in an effort to 
promote global coherence.90 To be sure, these suggestions have been limited to 
within-category comparisons, but there is good reason to be more ambitious, so 
as to counteract the problems identified here. We shall return to this point below, 
in connection with the idea of sentencing guidelines, and the goal of decreasing 
incoherence in criminal sentencing.  
 
What we have said supports the practice not only of remittitur but of 
additur  as well, through which appellate courts increase awards that are shown 
to be too low. Undoubtedly some judgments are now insufficiently severe in 
light of judgments in other categories, and if reducing incoherence is the goal, it 
would be a good idea to ensure that judges increase those awards. It is most 
unfortunate that the right to trial by jury is now taken to forbid additur in federal 
court.91 We suggest that when they can, judges should use additur and remittitur 
more self-consciously as efforts to correct judgments that are anomalous when 
placed in the context of other outcomes. Indeed our findings provide more 
general support for the view that judges should take a stronger hand in 
overseeing both high and low awards, on the theory that the predictable 
incoherence of one-shot jury judgments undermines the populist credentials of 
those awards. If ordinary people would themselves deem those judgments 
incoherent, why should judges be unwilling to disturb them? Of course there 
would be some social cost to keeping the institution of the jury while also 
                                                           
89 There is mounting evidence that judges are subject to the same cognitive processes as everyone else. See, 
e.g., W. Kip Viscusi; Chris Guthrie et al., supra. 
90 Martell v. Boardwalk Enters, Inc., 748 F2d 740, 752-53, 755 (2d Cir 1984); Geressy v. Digital Equipment, 980 
F Siupp 640, 657-60 (EDNY 1997). Cf. Cooper v Leatherman, supra at 15-16: “Differences in the institutional 
competence of trial judges and appellate judges are consistent with our conclusion. In Gore, we instructed 
courts evaluating a punitive damages award’s consistency with due process to consider three criteria: (1) the 
degree or reprehensibility of the defendant’ s misconduct, (2) the disparity between the harm (or potential 
harm) suffered by the plaintiff and the punitive damages award, and (3) the difference between the punitive 
damages awarded by the jury and the civil penalties authorized or imposed in comparable cases. 517 U. S., 
at 574–575. Only with respect to the first Gore inquiry do the district courts have a somewhat superior 
vantage over courts of appeals, and even then the advantage exists primarily with respect to issues turning 
on witness credibility and demeanor.14 Trial courts and appellate courts seem equally capable of analyzing 
the second factor. And the third Gore criterion, which calls for a broad legal comparison, seems more suited 
to the expertise of appellate courts. Considerations of institutional competence therefore fail to tip the 
balance in favor of deferential appellate review.” 
91 Dimick v. Schiedt, 293 U.S. 474 (1935).    33
reducing its authority; and those who believe that the civil jury is an important 
social institution will be skeptical of any effort to reduce its role.  
 
There is an independent concern. If judges have predictable prejudices – 
if, for example, they are systematically, and improperly, pro-defendant in some 
cases – the argument for increasing judicial control is greatly weakened. We 
should be willing to tolerate a degree of predictable incoherence if this is the 
price of avoiding a (coherent) set of biased and unjust awards. Coherence is not a 
trumping value. And indeed there is some (disputed) evidence that judges are 
less willing to award punitive damages at all, and also that they tend to impose 
systematically lower awards than juries.92 Of course this is not evidence that 
judges are biased; perhaps they are right and juries are wrong. But if the problem 
lies in judicial bias of some kind or another, there is little reason to approve of the 
status quo; the remedy for bias may well lie in attempting to discipline jury 
discretion through exemplars or guidelines, modeled perhaps on the Sentencing 
Guidelines, designed to impose presumptive floors and ceilings on awards. This 
suggestion takes us directly to a final reform strategy. 
  
3. Bureaucratic rationality. The most radical response to predictable 
incoherence would be based on the idea of bureaucratic rationality. Here the goal 
would be to create a kind of "grid" of penalties, matched to the individual facts of 
diverse cases. As it arises, each case would be fit into the grid. For punitive 
damages, for example, an agency, overseen perhaps by Congress and working  
with courts or perhaps entirely independently, might generate a system of 
financial  punishments for different categories of harm. We have seen that there 
would be significant problems in attracting public agreement on any such 
system, at least if it attempts to rank harms from diverse categories. But it might 
well be better to try to ensure that any ranking exercise is explicit rather than 
implicit, and that the ranking that is observed in practice is something better than 
an artifact of the cognitive forces that we have discussed here. We will be 
agnostic here on the substantive judgments that would go into the resulting 
outcomes. The system might be based on optimal deterrence theory; it might be 
rooted in retributive intuitions; it might be some kind of mix.  
 
a. Antecedents. There is nothing new about the idea of producing more 
sensible ranking through bureaucratic institutions. Indeed, a great movement of 
                                                           
92 But note that in Theodore Eisenberg & Kevin Claremont, Trial by Jury or Judge: Transcending Empiricism, 
77 Cornell L. Rev. 1124, 1992), it is urged that in product liability and medical malpractice cases, plaintiffs 
prevail at higher rate before judges than before juries. And in several categories of personal-injury liability, 
the mean recovery is higher in judge trials.   34
twentieth century law has been from case-by-case adjudicative decisions toward 
a system of bureaucratic judgment, cabined by rules laid down in advance. The 
most familiar example is probably workers” compensation, designed to replace 
ad hoc judicial judgments with something more systematic.93  The same kind of 
reform can be found in the area of social security disability determinations, 
where a high level of inequality in individual judgments produced a system of 
"grids" designed to produce greater coherence. 94  The Sentencing Guidelines 
were similarly responsive to a perception of incoherent judgments, 95 though 
there the claim was that criminal sentences were incoherent within as well as 
across categories.  
 
b. Current initiatives. Bureaucratic solutions are not foreign to the areas 
discussed here. Some states have moved in this direction with respect to 
contingent valuation.  Consider, for example, the remarkable approach adopted 
by the Texas Parks and Wildlife Department. A regulation is designed to 
establish values of injured or destroyed fish, birds, and animals. 96  These values 
are determined by assigning a score of 0 to 3 for eight specified "scoring criteria." 
97  The criteria include recreation; aesthetic; educational; scarcity; environmental 
tolerance (that is, the ability of the species to tolerate changes in climate and so 
forth; economics (economic benefit of the species); recruitment (reproductive and 
survival capacity); ecological role. After the individual scores are added to 
produce a ‘total criteria score," that score is multiplied by a "weighting factor" 
that relates to the overall demand for the species; the weighting factor ranges 
from 1.0 (no additional public demand beyond the eight criteria) to 1.5 (for 
scarcity). The adjusted recovery score produces a recovery value for the species, 
one that is fully monetized. Special provisions are included for endangered (an 
additional payment of $1000) and threatened species (an additional payment of 
$500). 98  
                                                           
93 See Fishback, supra note. 
94 See Jerry Mashaw, Bureaucratic Justice (1983). 
95 See Breyer, supra note. 
96 See section 69.20. 
97 Id. at 69.22. 
98 Pursuant to this rule, the Texas Parks and Wildlife Department has issued a 74-page document listing 
monetary equivalents; consider, for purposes of illustration, the following excerpt: 
 
Bass, guadalupe, 1 inch  $.50 
Bass, guadalupe, 21 inch  $184.19 
Mackeral, King, 69 inch  $404.60 
Shark, Sand, 131 inch  $211.81 
Mule Deer , F  $163 
Mule Deer, M  $525.50   35
Punitive damages, assessed in court, can be seen as a substitute for 
administrative penalties, and many agencies  impose civil penalties via a method 
of this kind. As we shall see below, the problem is that agencies tend to operate 
in isolation, in a way that creates independent risks of global incoherence; the 
question is whether the existing system of administrative fines might itself be 
rationalized. Consider, as a model in this regard, state systems for workers” 
compensation, which explicitly set out damage remedies for various injuries. 
Perhaps punitive awards could be made part of a general schedule of civil 
penalties.  
 
The strongest objection to a bureaucratic model would be similar to that 
raised in the judicial context -- distrust of the relevant bureaucrats (or of the 
political actors overseeing their operations). If interest-group pressures would 
distort judgments, or if the resulting "grid" would contain systematic injustice,  it 
may be better to continue with a system that contains a degree of incoherence. 
But these issues cannot be assessed in the abstract.  
 
Our goal here has not been to argue for any particular reform proposal, 
but simply to offer a sense of some of the possibilities. With respect to punitive 
damages, we are confident that we have shown a serious, and thus far 
unexplored, problem with the existing system. Our emphasis has been on the 
avoidance of obvious anomalies, not on the achievement of global coherence. We 
are not confident about a plan for reform, in part because of the sheer range of 
                                                                                                                                                                             
Sheep, Desert Bighorn  $2,850 
Prairie Chicken, Attwaters  $7,100.50 
Pheasant $35.50 
Jaguar $2,850.50 
Mountain Lion  $525.50 
Skunk, stripped  $15.50 
Whopping crane  $7,100.50 
Brown pelican  $2,850.50 
Texas Tortoise  $163.00 
Deer $1 
Loggerhead Turtle  $1,050.50 
Elk $1 
Texas Rat Snake  $3.00 
Golden cheeked Warbler  $7.100.50 
 
The particular judgments may seem a bit arbitrary; why is an elk worth $1, compared to the $1.050.50 
penalty for killing a loggerhead turtle? What is important is that the Texas provision actually offers an 
answer to this question, one that is relatively transparent to the public, and one that ensures that the various 
values line up with one another along the stated criteria.   36
considerations involved. But we believe that incoherence is a form of injustice, 
and that it is unquestionably worthwhile to attempt to find solutions.   
 
VI. Administrative Penalties 
 
 In the modern administrative state, civil penalties are not assessed in the 
same way as punitive damages. Congress establishes maximum penalties, 
generally on a statute-by-statute basis. Congress also establishes enforcement 
levels via appropriations. Faced with these constraints, agencies have 
considerable room to maneuver, both in choosing the level of the fine (subject to 
the statutory maximum) and in deciding whether to bring an enforcement action, 
and to seek fines, in particular cases. On the basis of our findings here, we 
hypothesize, not that everyone would agree on what a coherent ranking would 
look like, but that an investigation of the full range of administrative penalties 
would show what many people would see as anomalies – that the set of penalties 
actually sought and imposed could not, in the view of most people, possibly be 
squared with one another.  Those who come up with penalties are not forced to 
rationalize the system, in part because people do not spontaneously call for 
rationalization, or even attempt to see whether penalties  form a sensible pattern. 
We attempt to illustrate the problem here, by identifying the statutory maxima 
and to raise questions about whether they suggest a coherent set of judgments on 
Congress” part. We can also suggest two factors that contribute to the existing 
situation: category-bound judgments and the translation problem. 
 
In the context of administrative penalties, category-bound judgments take 
a distinctive form. In these situations, legislators or administrators often consider 
an entire category at once, such as injuries to wild birds. In such cases, the 
emotional response attached to the category label will be of critical importance. 
An entire category might be misjudged in separate evaluation (where 
misjudgment is understood by reference to people’s own beliefs about the sense 
or nonsense of the resulting overall pattern). Of course political pressure can be 
influential here. As we will see, the punishments for occupational safety and 
health violations are relatively light; we are confident  that political pressures are 
a large part of the reason. But the difficulties that we have identified – category-
bound thinking and the translation problem – are partly responsible for the 
incoherence. It would be much harder, politically speaking, to bias judgments 
toward an entire category if translation were easy and if explicit comparisons to 
another category were brought into the picture.   37
A. Background 
 
One of the most important movements of the post-New Deal state has 
been the emergence of administrative penalties for wrongdoers. If a company or 
individual has violated regulations involving occupational safety, or protection 
of endangered species, some sanction is in order. Often criminal penalties are 
deemed too severe for regulatory violations, and civil penalties, in the form of 
fines, take up the slack. But what is the appropriate level of such penalties? What 
is the proper frame of reference?  
 
1. Overview. Our starting point is that administrative penalties are 
generally assigned at the same time to a set of harms or risks that belong to a 
single category, in a process that does not encourage the consideration of other 
categories of harms or risks. Adapting the conclusions of our analysis of punitive 
damage awards to judgments of categories, we can suggest the following:  
 
•  Categories of harms vary in the intensity of the emotions that they 
evoke; 
•  moral intuitions do not specify a scaling factor for the task of 
translating punitive intent into dollars; 
•  there is almost complete consensus on the relative positions of some 
categories, and substantial consensus on others; 
•  because harms from different categories are not transparently 
commensurable, a misranking of harms from different categories is 
unlikely to attract attention;  
•  organizations and individuals setting penalties for categories of harms 
consider them one at a time, and determine a special modulus for each 
occasion. 
 
This list of psychological considerations suggests three hypotheses about 
administrative penalties. First, the ranking of harms and penalties within each 
category of harms will generally reflect public sentiment.  Second, the levels of 
penalties for different categories of harms will not necessarily reflect the ranking 
of these categories in the public sentiment. Third, incoherence of penalties for 
different categories of harm is likely to be tolerated and to persist over time. As 
we shall see, each of these hypotheses is confirmed. 
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2. Politics. The idea that there is no intuitively compelling way to scale 
punishments suggests that political dynamics will play a central role in driving 
penalties up or down.99 Where interest groups opposing the regulatory scheme 
are well-organized, we should expect low penalties; when such groups are 
poorly organized, and when those enthusiastic about the regulatory plan have 
considerable political power, we should expect severe penalties.100 The 
translation problem compounds the difficulty. Well-organized groups might well 
take advantage of the arbitrariness of judgments about appropriate dollar 
penalties, simply because the public will have a hard time knowing whether one 
or another number is excessive or insufficient – at least if cross-category 
comparisons are not made. The translation problem thus creates a lack of 
transparency in civil fines, including administrative penalties. A wider 
viewscreen would of course increase transparency. 
 
There is an independent point. The administrative state is heavily 
balkanized, with largely independent institutions engaged in independent tasks, 
and with separate congressional committees engaged in oversight. The 
Occupational Safety and Health Administration has its own network of duties, 
under the auspices of the Department of Labor; so too with the Fish and Wildlife 
Service, under the Department of the Interior; and so too with the Environmental 
Protection Agency. In an enterprise as enormous as the national government, 
some such division of labor seems inevitable. But without a mechanism for 
ensuring coherence, the effect of the balkanization, at the level of committees and 
regulatory bodies, might well be to produce incoherence, for the reasons we have 
traced here. Does the system of regulatory penalties show the expected pattern of 
within-category coherence and cross-category incoherence? In asking that 
question, we do not mean to require observers to ask complicated normative 
questions about appropriate penalties, but to focus attention on a question 
related to that  posed in previous sections: If the various penalties are put 
together, would ordinary people conclude that the system of penalties makes 
little sense?  If so, we claim, consistently with what we have urged above, that 
the system is unjust, or at least that it contains significant areas of injustice.  
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B.  The Pattern of Penalties 
 
Consider the following table, capturing a subset of the universe of 
administrative penalties (see Appendix D for a fuller version): 
 
Table 2: Selected Civil Penalties from Administrative Agencies 
 
Agency Civil/ 
Criminal 
Type of violation  Penalty 
     
OSHA  Civil  Violation of a serious nature  Up to 7000 
  Civil  Violation of non-serious nature  Up to 7000 
     
FDA  Civil  Egg products inspection act- violation  Up  to 1000 
  Civil  Above + intent to defraud or distribute 
adulterated eggs 
Up to 10000 
     
Fish and 
Wildlife 
Service 
Civil  Violation of Wild Bird Conservation Act   Up to 25000 
  Civil  Violate WBCA 111 a1 or 2 (import in 
violation of ban )or permit under 112 
(exemptions for sci research and ltd 
breeding) 
Up to 25000 
  Civil  Civil violation of African Elephant 
Conservation Act 
Up to 5000 
  Civil  Violation of  Bald Eagle Protection Act   Up to 5000 
     
EEOC   Civil  Give public information about unlawful 
employment practice under T7 during 
proceeding 
Up to 1000 
  Civil  Discriminatory practice with malice  Punitive damages 
  Civil  Total damages under t7 for small 
business (under 100 employees) 
Up to 50,000 
  Civil  Total damages under T7 for medium 
business (over 100 less than 200 
employees) 
Up to 100,000 
  Civil  Total damages under T7 for large 
business (Over 200 less than 500) 
Up to 200,000 
  Civil  Total damages under T7 for big business 
(more than 500) 
Up to 300,000   40
  Civil  Willful violation of section 15 of equal 
pay act 
Up to 10,000 
  Criminal  See above  Up to 6 mo. prison 
 
 
Notice that within categories, penalties seem extremely sensible, at least in 
the sense that the more serious harms are punished more severely.  For 
occupational safety and health violations, the largest penalties are for repeated 
violations, the next largest for violations that are both willful and serious; the 
least serious for failures to engage in the requisite record-keeping. The Wild Bird 
Conservation Act imposes its most serious penalties for unlawful imports of wild 
birds or members of endangered species; penalties are less severe if violations 
are not undertaken as part of import-export business, or if they are not knowing 
and willful. The most serious acts of discrimination are subject to more serious 
penalties. In general, each of the regulatory arrangements shows a high degree of 
internal consistency. 
 
At the same time, it is clear that this system contains serious anomalies. 
The penalties do not fit together as a coherent whole, and it is most unlikely that 
most people would approve of all of what appears here. The most obvious set of 
anomalies involve OSHA. A serious violation of OSHA calls for a maximum 
penalty of $7000; unlawful importation of a wild bird calls for a penalty of more 
than triple that amount ($25,000). In fact the penalties imposed by the Fish and 
Wildlife Service are systematically higher than those imposed by OSHA.  It is 
extremely doubtful that the public  would support that pattern of penalties, 
taken as a whole.  
 
Of course it is possible that agency enforcement patterns create sense out 
of nonsense. Perhaps those statutes with low maximum fines are frequently 
enforced, and perhaps enforcement activity, in such cases, involves maximum 
fines – whereas statutes with anomalously high maximum fines might be 
enforced less frequently, and agencies might seek fines toward the low end. We 
would be surprised if this were true. But for present purposes, the key point is 
that no one seems even to have asked whether the resulting pattern of fines, on 
the books or in the world, makes any sense at all.  
 
C. Difficult Cross-Category Comparisons 
 
It is relatively easy to compare OSHA violations with OSHA violations; it 
is much harder to compare OSHA violations with Endangered Species Act   41
violations or with acts of unlawful discrimination. To be sure, categories 
themselves can probably be compared. Offhand, most people are likely to think 
that it is worse to subject someone to life-threatening working conditions than to 
discriminate against them. It is reasonable to suppose that the category of 
occupational safety and health violations ranks higher than the category of 
unlawful discrimination, Hence it is odd that an act of discrimination can receive 
a penalty of $50,000 and more, whereas an OSHA violation is subject to a $7000 
ceiling. But many cross-category comparisons are much harder to make. An 
egregious act of discrimination (say, firing a long-time employee on the basis of 
racist motivations, and attempting to ruin that employee’s career) is difficult to 
compare with a milder case of occupational safety violation (say, failing to 
ensure that ladders and toilets comply with OSHA regulations).  
 
Illustrations could easily be multiplied. A general conclusion follows. A 
consensus is hard to achieve on the content of full coherence (return to the 
epigraph from Justice Breyer); but it would be much easier to achieve general 
agreement that certain outcomes are truly anomalous. This point is directly 
relevant to the question of institutional reform.  
 
D. A Civil Penalties Commission? 
 
The data alone cannot show how and to what extent it would be appropriate 
to revise the set of administrative penalties, once they are taken as a whole. The 
initial problem is that to our knowledge, the pattern of penalties has not, until 
now, even been presented as such. The oddity to which we draw attention is the 
remarkable tolerance of the system for a set of outcomes that do not fit together 
and that show significant anomalies.  Legislators and administrators appear to 
have made judgments within categories without investigating whether the 
resulting judgments can be criticized as palpably incoherent. Whatever the 
difficulties in producing a rational pattern – and they are formidable – at least it 
seems clear that some effort should be made to correct the worst outliers. 
Because courts must take statutes and regulations as they stand, there is little that 
judges can do about the problem. Instead reforms must come from executive and 
legislative spheres.  
 
In these circumstances we suggest three possible routes to reform. First, the 
Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA), within the Office of 
Management and Budget (OMB), should provide a full accounting of regulatory 
penalties, publicize it, and evaluate the existing pattern of outcomes, with 
recommendations both to agencies and to Congress. The longstanding missions   42
of OIRA in particular and OMB in general have been to produce more in the way 
of global rationality, with respect to regulation and the budget generally.101 This 
role should be extended to better  rationalization of the system of administrative 
penalties. Note in this regard that even without legislative change, agencies have 
considerable room to maneuver. Seeing that occupational safety violations are 
low, they might choose penalties at the high end of the permissible range. Seeing 
that penalties for violations of the Wild Bird Conservation Act are relatively 
high, the Fish and Wildlife Service might select penalties at the low end of the 
permissible range. The purpose of executive oversight would be to move agency 
practice in the direction of a sensible overall pattern of penalties.  Of course we 
have suggested that coherence is difficult to achieve, in part because people do 
not agree on what it requires, because they do not find it easy to rank cases from 
diverse categories. But at the very least, a coherence commission could correct 
palpable errors; and perhaps it could try to be more ambitious.  
 
The second route for reform involves Congress. On both the House and 
Senate sides, we suggest that a new subcommittee should be created on 
administrative penalties, growing out of existing committees on regulation and 
administrative practice. The purpose of the subcommittees should be to gather 
information about administrative penalties, as described in statutes and 
regulation, and also about actual agency practices – with the goal of publicizing 
the results and ultimately enacting corrective legislation, at least in response to 
the most obvious anomalies. Nothing said here establishes the appropriate 
content of that legislation. But we believe that we have established that if the 
overall pattern is not presented before citizens and representatives, incoherence 
and injustice are inevitable results.  
 
A third route would involve a mixture of legislative and administrative 
action. Acting on the model of the Sentencing Commission, Congress should 
create a Civil Penalties Commission, whose responsibility would be to give a 
public accounting of civil penalties, system-wide, and to propose standards for 
rationalizing them. The simplest task of the Civil Penalties Commission would 
be to correct the most obvious errors; as we have seen, it would be much harder 
to produce agreement on what would make the full set of outcomes coherent. 
More generally, the Civil Penalties Commission should give a sense of the 
relationship between the law on the books (including statutory maxima and 
minima) and actual practice (for example, the frequency, median, average, and 
range of penalties). Like the Sentencing Commission, it should be composed of 
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diverse people; it might well include judges. The Civil Penalties Commission 
would have the authority to issue guidelines to discipline administrative 
agencies, so as to increase the likelihood of coherence. Perhaps the guidelines 
should be binding rather than merely advisory. In the interest of public 
disclosure, the Civil Penalties Commission should maintain a website containing 
information about current practice, allow comparisons, and discussing 
proposals. Of course the actions of the Civil Penalties Commission would be 
subject to congressional review.  
 
We conclude this section by commenting on similarities and differences 
between this discussion of administrative penalties and the earlier discussion of 
punitive damages and contingent valuation.  The critical difference is that 
penalties are now set by category, not by case.  The main source of incoherence is 
not normalization, but the arbitrariness inherent in the use of dollar values (or 
indeed, of other numerical scales such as time in jail) to express the intensity of 
the response to harms and to the people who perpetrate them. What is common 
to findings in both types of problems is that people’s thinking does not 
spontaneously cross boundaries between categories; when setting penalties for 
violations of the fish and wildlife statutes, people do not naturally ask about 
penalties for violation of the tax and pollution laws.  Indeed, in the current 
arrangement, an administrator charged with attention to one category of 
problems who actively considered problems from other categories might accused 
of wasting resources or even of poaching on the turf of other officials.  In 
addition, a full understanding of administrative penalties would require an 
exploration of political dynamics and, in particular, the role of interest groups in 
assigning dollar values to regulatory violations. Interest group power is 
undoubtedly magnified by the difficulty of knowing what different amounts 
mean in the context of the system as a whole. As we have suggested, interest 
group power would be greatly reduced if comparisons were routine – if the 
penalties established under one statute were routinely evaluated against a 
number of penalties from other categories. We think that such comparisons 
would be highly likely to increase the sense and rationality of a system that, on 
both counts, currently falls short. 
 
VII. Predictable Incoherence: Extensions, Speculations, Remedies 
 
If one-shot judgments are predictably incoherent in the contexts discussed 
thus far, it is likely that the legal system is beset by similar problems elsewhere. 
We now broaden the viewscreen, not to resolve the issues with which we will   44
deal, but to show that related difficulties can be found in other domains. The 
overarching point is that incoherence is likely to be created, and to persist, 
wherever cases are considered one at a time, because of the translation problem, 
category-bound thinking, or both. Our goal here, as elsewhere, is not to suggest 
that agreement on full coherence is easy or even possible to achieve, but instead 
to emphasize the possibility of correcting the worst abuses once the viewscreen is 
widened and comparisons are made. 
 
A.  Criminal Penalties: A Cognitive Perspective on Guidelines 
To say the least, the topic of sentencing guidelines has received massive 
attention.102 Our findings cast new light on the value of such guidelines – not 
only to overcome differences among judges (an original inspiration for the 
guidelines103), but also to reduce the predictable problems created when people 
are selecting penalties one case, or one category, at a time (a difficulty that the 
guidelines do not attempt to solve).104 If we are right, judicial sentencing without 
guidelines is likely to produce incoherence, simply because people do not 
naturally seek to put individual decisions into a sensible overall pattern. The 
same problems will arise for legislatures imposing criminal punishments by 
categories. And if those who create sentencing guidelines are not alert to the 
problems, they will not solve them.  
 
  To be sure, it is not impossible that judicial experience with a wide range 
of cases could reduce the problem of incoherent sentences. It is conceivable that 
by virtue of their experience, judges engaged in sentencing have a kind of 
“sentencing menu” in their heads, reducing the difficulties we have found here.  
On the other hand, our evidence suggests that the difficulties will persist unless 
they are explicitly drawn to people’s attention. Whether and how judges can 
overcome the relevant problems remains an empirical question, one that we 
discuss in more detail below. But even the most experienced judge must engage 
in isolated sentencing decisions, and it is highly likely that without guidelines, 
within-category coherence and global incoherence will be the result. To the 
extent that sentencing guidelines can reduce this problem, they should provide 
large improvements. 
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But we do not mean only to provide support for the idea of federal 
sentencing guidelines. Our discussion suggests that there is good reason for 
much more in the way of rationalization at the state and federal levels. Within 
the states, there continue to be many anomalies. In Illinois, for example, an 
assault – defined as knowingly or recklessly causing serious bodily injury – is a 
misdemeanor with a penalty of up to thirty days imprisonment105; an assault 
against a public servant is also a misdemeanor, with a maximum penalty of one 
year in jail.106 So far so good. But possession of an endangered  plant for 
commercial use is treated the same way, with a maximum one year sentence,107 
and destruction of a nest of wild birds is a felony, treated more seriously than 
many violent crimes, with a maximum sentence of two to five years.108 As far as 
we are aware, no state has made even a minimal effort to rationalize its system of 
criminal punishment. In fact we are aware of no work, academic or otherwise, 
that attempts to explore whether state penalties fit into a sensible whole. 
 
At the same time, the federal sentencing guidelines do not avoid the problem 
of global incoherence. As we have noted, the Sentencing Commission built on 
existing judicial practice, and did not attempt to overcome the problems 
discussed here.109 Justice Breyer's suggestion, quoted above, is that the 
Commission’s relative lack of ambition was a product of the sheer difficulty of 
the task of achieving agreement on rankings across categories. Most of the 
ongoing work of the Sentencing Commission has involved the achievement of 
within-category coherence, a much easier task. The existence of extremely high 
penalties for drug offenses, alongside lower penalties for crimes of violence, 
attests to the problem. But the problem goes deeper still, involving not only 
incoherence but also complexities in defining categories.  
 
The most highly publicized anomalies involve the treatment of powder and 
crack cocaine.110 Under federal law, it takes one hundred times as much powder 
cocaine as crack cocaine to trigger equivalent mandatory penalties, so that the 
mandatory five-year penalty applies to someone with 500 grams of powder 
cocaine and five grams of crack cocaine.111 Perhaps powder cocaine and crack 
cocaine should be seen as different categories, rather than subcategories of 
“cocaine,” because of the fact that crack cocaine is more often associated with 
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systemic crime.112 For current purposes, what is most important is that the 
comparison with the two has produced the widespread view that penalties for 
crack cocaine are far too severe.113 This view is itself evidence for our basic claim 
here: It is easy to suggest that powder cocaine and crack cocaine belong to the 
same category, and hence easy to generate a public outcry against the within-
category inconsistency. In the abstract, it might be hard to know whether one or 
another mandatory minimum is best, perhaps because of the difficulty of finding 
a “modulus” with which to scale. The comparative exercise produces public 
concern. 
 
This is simply one example. The Sentencing Commission, and Congress 
itself, should engage in far more in the way of cross-category comparisons, 
designed to reduce the largest anomalies, in the form of both excessive severity 
and unwarranted leniency.   
 
B. Contingent  Valuation 
The practice of contingent valuation raises many complex questions, and 
it is not clear that the practice can be defended.114 Recall that contingent valuation 
is a procedure in which people are asked to scale their attitude to different 
harms, and to public actions to correct or mitigate harms, on a scale of 
hypothetical willingness to pay.  As we have seen, the psychological difficulties 
associated with the task of a respondent in a contingent valuation survey are 
precisely analogous to the difficulties faced by a juror in determining punitive 
damages.115  The translation problem – the absence of a principled or intuitively 
compelling way to use the dollar scale – arises in two different ways.  First, the 
numbers that people provide for any specific problem are arbitrary, and 
therefore not a sensible guide for policy.  Second, the normalization process 
tends to distort the valuations of items from different categories. We have seen 
that ecological problems gain a great deal from being presented in isolation, and 
that health problems lose from that style of presentation. At the very least, 
people answering contingent valuation questions should not be restricted to a 
small set of problems from one or more categories.  
 
The most modest reform would attempt to ensure that any responses to 
contingent valuation questions are given after exposure to sufficient information 
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to counteract the difficulties discussed here. Some people have attempted to 
design a contingent valuation study that offers a wide range of categories, so as 
to diminish the risk of incoherence.116  Respondents could be asked about 
problems from a number of cases at once, so as to ensure that any particular 
answer follows from cross-category comparisons. There are, however,  problems 
with this approach, akin to those discussed in the context of punitive damages: 
information overload, framing, and manipulation.117 People can process a small 
set of cases, but any such set risks framing effects; a full range of cases, sufficient 
to overcome those effects, might overload people’s cognitive capacities. It is not 
clear that this modest reform could ultimately succeed. 
 
A much less modest reform, based on the approach in Texas, would be to 
move away from contingent valuation and toward a damage schedule for 
environmental harms, based on a combination of technocratic and democratic 
judgments.118 Such a schedule would be produced by people considering the full 
range of cases. The most serious risk of such a reform is that coherence would be 
purchased at the price of increasing interest-group power over the determination 
of penalties. The extent of this risk cannot be assessed in the abstract. 
 
Because the evaluation of these reforms raises many of the same questions 
as in the context of punitive damages, and because there is an emerging 
literature on the point,119 we will not discuss them in any detail here. What we 
have added is a fresh reason for skepticism about many contingent valuation 
studies: They do not require people to engage in cross-category comparisons, 
and hence they generate outcomes that people would not themselves endorse, 
taken as a whole. 
 
C. Regulatory Crazy-Quilts 
 
Related issues arise in the continuing debates about expenditures on life-
saving expenditures. The central point here is that agencies generally decide on 
the appropriate extent of regulation without being required to engage in cross-
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category comparison (and indeed with little in the way of constraints from 
Congress120). Agencies generally act in isolation, and without specifying the 
regulatory expenditure per life saved; this institutional fact has increased the 
difficulty of ensuring global coherence. For many years, agency actions were 
categorized by subject matter, and no one attempted to ensure cross-category 
comparisons, let alone to see if the relevant actions could be seen as falling, in 
some sense, within the same category. 
 
In 1986, an official at the Office of Management and Budget had an 
extremely clever, psychologically acute idea, and a simple table was compiled, 
allowing comparisons of agency practice.121 That table has come to dominate 
many discussions of these problems.122 (See the Appendix E for a recent version). 
The table seemed to have such an effect in part because it made the underlying 
numbers explicit, and in part because it makes comparisons possible across 
programs. Indeed, the dramatic effect of the table seemed to stem from the fact 
that it put a wide range of seemingly separate problems under a single 
“category”: government efforts to save lives through regulatory protection. Once 
the table was constructed, unnoticed anomalies became highly visible, because 
they seemed, all of a sudden, to involve within-category nonsense, to which 
people are extremely sensitive. It should be no surprise that critics of the table 
have urged that separate categories are involved here, and that people should 
not be so quick to think that the current situation is senseless.123 This response 
makes perfect psychological sense.  
 
A prominent study of five hundred life-saving interventions goes much 
further.124 The study shows systematic disparities in expenditures across 
agencies, with some problems receiving apparently disproportionate attention. 
Consider, for example, the fact that the median cost per life year is $23,000 for the 
Federal Aviation Administration; $68,000 for the Consumer Product Safety 
Commission; $78,000 for the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration; 
$88,000 for the Occupational Safety and Health Administration; and several 
million dollars for the Environmental Protection Agency.125  Here too cross-
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category comparisons has played a large role in reform debates,126 suggesting 
that American government could save the same number of lives it now saves 
with $31 billion in savings – or that we could use the same level of resources we 
now use, and end up saving 60,000 more lives every year 
 
To be sure, this is not a “pure” case of the kind that we have been 
emphasizing throughout: Many of the relevant government actions were 
apparently undertaken without explicit decisions about the relevant numbers, or 
about how much should be spent in different areas. Hence the evidence shows 
apparently inexplicable disparities within agencies.  We believe that an 
investigation of those anomalies, and an attempt to correct them, would be likely 
to alter government behavior, and perhaps to save money and lives in the 
process.  
 
VIII.  Cognitive Notes on Legal Theory 
 
Our findings here bear on two intensely debated issues in legal theory. 
The first involves the aspiration to fully coherent law. The second involves the 
idea of “incommensurability.” We will not engage the normative issues here, but 
we will suggest that an understanding of cognitive issues illuminates both 
debates. 
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A.  Categories, Coherence, Cognition 
The last years have seen an intense debate about the aspiration to global 
coherence in law.127 Much of the debate has involved the appropriate conception 
of legal reasoning, an issue with both normative and descriptive dimensions. 
Ronald Dworkin has been the most prominent advocate  of ambitious thinking, 
in which judges do not always restrict themselves to small pockets of problems, 
but sometimes attempt to ensure that all parts of law fit together as a principled 
whole.128 Others (including one of the current authors) have argued against this 
idea, on the ground that it would strain judicial capacities, and perhaps tend to 
produce errors of its own.129 In a discussion of particular relevance to our topic 
here, Dworkin discusses the “compartmentalization of law into separate 
departments” and sees that as a “prominent feature of legal practice.”130 
Hercules, Dworkin's idealized judge, makes judgments that “expand out from 
the immediate case before him in a series of concentric circles,” increasingly far 
afield from the particular case and category at hand.131 Hercules does not take the 
law’s compartments for granted, and he is willing to reject any idea of “local 
priority” where ‘traditional boundaries between departments have become 
mechanical and arbitrary.”132 It seems clear that Hercules is willing to attempt 
global coherence, as, for example, through “a new unification of private law that 
blurs even the long-established and once much firmer boundary between 
contract and tort.”133 Advocates of less ambitious thinking stress that judges are 
not in a good position to make global sense of multiple areas of the law, and that 
the effort to try, especially if it is early, might well overwhelm the cognitive 
capacities of judges.134 
 
Our findings here do not resolve these issues, which have arisen in a 
much broader context than those discussed here. We have assessed judgments 
within and across categories, but in the relatively simple setting of judgments 
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about penalties rendered in terms of dollars or years. We have not explored how 
the process of category-bound judgments would affect free speech principles in 
categories involving pornography, commercial speech, and libel, or tort and 
contract principles involving medical malpractice, building construction, and 
prescription drug companies. It would be important to know whether (for 
example) people’s judgments about the appropriate treatment of false 
commercial speech and libelous speech would be different in isolation from what 
they would be if the two categories were considered together. We do not have 
evidence on that issue. Nonetheless, we think that what we have found casts 
some fresh light on this debate, giving a more detailed account of why it is hard 
to produce global coherence, but also providing new support for Dworkin's 
view, on the ground that local pockets of coherence might well produce an 
overall pattern that is senseless, or that at least contains what everyone would 
see as senselessness.  
 
To be sure, global coherence would be a significant strain on judicial 
capacities, in part because the mental operations involved do not come naturally. 
Judicial efforts to provide more limited forms of “local coherence,” through 
relatively unambitious reasoning by analogy, can be understood as a good way 
of avoiding cognitive overload – by focusing on the cognitively manageable 
category, and by failing to investigate problems from other categories. But our 
larger point cuts the other way, giving strong cognitive ammunition to 
Dworkin's plea for global coherence. We have provided fresh reason to believe 
that in law, the various categories showing internal coherence will not fit 
together -- and that the pattern of outcomes, generated by unambitious judges, 
will contain what they themselves would see as error and confusion. Referring 
precisely to this risk, Dworkin suggests that we “must strive, so far as we can, 
not to apply one theory of liability to pharmaceutical companies and a different 
one to motorists, not to embrace one theory of free speech when we are worried 
about pornography and another when we are worried about flag burning.”135 If 
law is to be coherent, Dworkin is entirely correct. Judges who seek only local 
coherence, or who proceed one case at a time, are highly likely to produce a 
pattern of outcomes of which they themselves would disapprove.  
 
B. Commensurability and Incommensurability 
 
          Are values or options commensurable?136 In what sense? Those who object 
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to the idea of commensurability claim that people lack a shared metric by which 
to assess an array of qualitatively distinctive options, and that the use of such a 
metric can do violence to our considered judgments about how such options 
should be assessed.137 On this view, ideas like “utility” and “efficiency” are quite 
inadequate, as a way of capturing the operation of practical reason in law or 
daily life; these ideas are inadequate because they elide qualitative differences 
that matter when people reason well.138  
 
We do not attempt to take a stand on any normative issues here, nor do 
we attempt to give anything like an account of the operation of practical reason. 
But we do suggest that our findings here help to establish a cognitive basis for 
part of the experience of “incommensurability” in both law and ordinary 
thinking. People lack confident judgments about how to rank cases from 
different categories, and their judgments on this point are not widely shared. 
Recall the difficulty of comparing a case of tax fraud with an occupational safety 
and health violation, or of ranking a case of outrageous commercial fraud with 
one involving a relatively minor physical injury. For those using ordinary 
intuitions, there is no readily available metric by which to make the relevant 
comparisons.139 It is in this particular respect that incommensurability is a 
concrete psychological phenomenon.140   
 
IX. Conclusion 
 
We have attempted here to identify some pervasive features of human 
judgment and cognition – features that, we believe, account for significant 
anomalies in both private and public law. In making many judgments in law, 
people must translate a moral judgment into numerical terms, involving dollars 
or years. Moreover, people’s judgments are insistently category-bound. They do 
not naturally seek coherence across categories. Their assessment of problems, 
taken in isolation, are often different from their judgments about problems, taken 
in the context of cases from other categories. This is largely because any 
judgment, in isolation, is made against a background of a “natural” comparison 
set, consisting of problems from the same basic category. Much of the time, 
people will look at problems from other categories only when forced to do so. 
When a problem from a different category is introduced, the isolated judgment is 
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unsettled, and people’s judgments will shift, sometimes quite dramatically. The 
reason is that the introduction of the new problem alters the set of comparison 
cases, and shifts in judgment are a common consequence of that alteration. 
 
The most important implication of this phenomenon is that judgments in 
isolation will predictably produce incoherence from the standpoint of the very 
people asked to make those judgments. This is true of judgments about punitive 
damage awards; it is also true of willingness to pay for public goods. Thus 
judgment shifts are easy to generate in experimental settings. Outside of those 
settings, we have seen similar results in the domains of regulatory penalties. The 
pattern of within-category coherence, and global incoherence, is a nearly 
inevitable product of adjudication, which is defined by one-shot judgments; but 
the same pattern is embedded in many domains of law and policy.  
 
These are descriptive points. It is far less clear what to do about the 
situation. Introduction of a single problem from one separate category may make 
things worse rather than better. There is a serious risk of manipulation and 
strategic behavior here; careful selection of the comparison case can drive 
judgment in predictable directions. Deaths of buffaloes may seem a relatively 
small problem when presented alongside deaths of human beings; but deaths of 
buffaloes may seem a relatively large problem when presented alongside injuries 
to plants. In these circumstances, the ideal solution, for a legal system committed 
to obtaining people’s reflective judgments, is to move in the direction of 
ensuring, not attention to one category or two, but simultaneous appreciation of 
the large number of categories of cases to which any particular case might be 
compared.  
 
Coherence is important; it seems to be a minimum requirement of 
rationality. But coherence is not a trumping value, and a system displaying 
incoherence may well be better than one that is coherent but pervasively unjust. 
An incoherent system in which penalties fit together, but are three times as high, 
or one-third as high, as they ought to be. Nonetheless, we think that any domain 
of law should aspire to coherence, at least as a presumption, in order to prevent 
the kinds of arbitrariness and injustice that we have found in both experimental 
and real-world settings. At the very least, efforts should be made to correct the 
most conspicuous anomalies – a goal that can be obtained without thinking that 
it is easy or even possible for people to agree on what full coherence actually 
requires. 
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We have emphasized throughout that for any single person, or jury, the 
achievement of coherence is an exceptionally difficult cognitive task. But steps in 
the direction of coherence are far  less difficult at the level of institutional 
design.141 We close with the suggestion that the practical remedies for predictably 
incoherent judgments are institutional; they involve the creation of frameworks 
for decision that ensure a pattern of judgments that, when taken as a whole, 
reflective people could endorse. Perhaps this seems an unrealistically ambitious 
aspiration. But something of just this sort underlies many of the most impressive 
institutional innovations of the twentieth century. It should not be too much to 
expect twenty-first century institutions to build on these precedents, bringing a 
measure of rationality and sense to areas of the law that now lack them.    
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Appendix A. Excepts from Instructions 
 
Background on Civil Legal Cases and Your Role 
 
In this part of the study, we would like you to imagine that you are a juror for a 
legal case in a civil court.  Civil law suits involve disputes between private individuals, 
companies, or individuals and companies, in which the plaintiff alleges that the 
defendant harmed them in some way.  The primary purpose of a civil suit brought by a 
plaintiff is to seek compensation from the defendant for the alleged harm.   
Civil suits involve two different types of potential damages that a defendant could 
be could be required to pay.  Compensatory damages are intended to fully compensate a 
plaintiff for the harm suffered as a result of the defendant’s actions.  Punitive damages 
are intended to achieve two purposes: (1) to punish the defendant for unusual 
misconduct, and (2) to deter the defendant and others from committing similar actions 
in the future.   
Punitive damages should be awarded if a preponderance of the evidence shows 
that the defendant acted either maliciously or with reckless disregard for the welfare of 
others.  Defendants are considered to have acted maliciously if they intended to injure or 
harm someone or their property.  Defendants are considered to have acted with reckless 
disregard for the welfare of others if they were aware of the probable harm to others or 
their property but disregarded it, and their actions were a gross deviation from the 
standard of care that a normal person would use.  
The case you will consider involves a special procedure that is sometimes used in 
civil trials, and which requires two different juries: (1) a trial jury, which decides 
whether the defendant should pay compensatory damages to the plaintiff, and if so in 
what amount, and (2) if compensatory damages are awarded, a separate punishment 
jury decides whether the defendant’s conduct also warrants punitive damages.  
Please imagine that you are a member of the punishment jury for this case. Your 
job is to decide whether and how much the defendant should be punished, in addition 
to paying compensatory damages.  
In the case you will consider, the trial jury has already ordered the defendant to 
pay compensatory damages to the plaintiff.  This does not necessarily mean that 
punitive damages must also be awarded.  Whether or not punitive damages should be 
awarded and if so how large they should be is completely separate from compensatory 
damages.    56
Appendix B. Example Pair of Legal Cases142 
 
B.1.  Marking v. Royal Motors (financial harm) 
 
Among his other large investments, William Marking owns Canyon Luxury 
Leasing, a company that leases luxury cars.  He bought 1000 cars from Royal Motors, a 
manufacturer of high-priced automobiles with annual profits of around $150 million.  
Royal Motors did not disclose the fact that the paint on all 1000 cars was not the original 
factory paint: all cars had been repainted from an ugly shade of green to the current 
colors of red and black. 
One month after the purchase, an employee of Royal Motors reported this fact to a 
local newspaper, and the repaintings received a great deal of national publicity.  Mr. 
Marking believes that people who lease luxury cars demand perfection, and that this 
negative publicity caused a sharp decrease in business.  He has sued Royal Motors for 
compensation. 
Internal documents of Royal Motors produced at the trial included a management 
memo:  "Marking will not be happy at all when he finds out that the cars have been 
repainted.  He will feel that we took advantage of him, but it was his responsibility to 
check the cars.  Anyway we run almost no risk: it will not be in Marking’s interest to 
publicize the problem, so he will not dare sue us, no matter how mad he is. The worst 
that will happen is that he won’t buy from us again.”  The trial jury ordered Royal 
Motors to pay $500,000 in compensatory damages.  
 
B.2.  Glover v. General Assistance (physical harm) 
 
Joan Glover, a five-year-old child, ingested a large number of pills of a non-
prescription allergy medicine called Allerfree.  The Allerfree bottle carried a label 
reading "Childproof Cap,” but it did not meet federal regulations for the use of that 
label. 
Joan’s parents testified that they had been very careful in ensuring that all of their 
medications had childproof safety caps. Joan found the pills in a kitchen drawer and 
ingested most of the bottle. The overdose permanently weakened her respiratory 
system, which will make her more susceptible to breathing-related diseases such as 
asthma and emphysema for the rest of her life, and may reduce her life expectancy. 
Joan’s parents sued the manufacturer of Allerfree, the General Assistance company, a 
drug manufacturer with annual profits of $150 million.  Internal company documents 
showed that General Assistance chose to ignore federal regulations about standards for 
using the label "childproof cap.”  An internal memo presented at trial says that ‘this 
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stupid, unnecessary federal regulation is a waste of our money"; it acknowledges the 
risk that Allerfree might be punished for violating the regulation but says  ‘the 
punishments are extremely mild; basically we”d be asked to improve the safety caps in 
the future." The trial jury ordered General Assistance to pay the Glovers $500,000 in 
compensatory damages. 
 
B.3.  Response Scales: Isolation 
 
What amount of punitive damages (if any) should Royal Motors be required to pay 
as punishment and to deter them and others from similar actions in the future?  
Compensatory damages do not count as part of the punishment.  Please write the 
appropriate amount of punitive damages in the blank below.  
 
   $  _____________________ 
 
OR 
 
How severely should Royal Motors be punished because of their actions, and to 
deter them and others from similar actions in the future?  Note that the compensatory 
damages that they must pay do not count as part of the punishment.  Please circle the 
number that best expresses your judgment of the appropriate level of punishment. 
 
            E x t r e m e l y  
  None  Mild   Substantial    Severe    Severe 
    0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8   
 
.4.  Response Scales: Comparison 
 
We would like you to compare this case (Glover v. General Assistance) to the legal case 
you saw earlier (Marking v. Royal Motors, which involved repainted cars). 
 
Compared to Royal Motors, how much punishment does General Assistance 
deserve? (please circle your answer) 
 
  Less than  The same as  More than 
  Royal Motors  Royal Motors  Royal Motors 
 
What amount of punitive damages (if any) should General Assistance be required 
to pay as punishment and to deter them and others from similar actions in the future?  
Compensatory damages do not count as part of the punishment.  Please write the 
appropriate amount of punitive damages in the blank below.  
 
   $  _____________________   58
 
OR 
 
How severely should General Assistance be punished because of their actions, and 
to deter them and others from similar actions in the future?  Note that the compensatory 
damages that they must pay do not count as part of the punishment.  Please circle the 
number that best expresses your judgment of the appropriate level of punishment. 
 
            E x t r e m e l y  
  None   Mild    Substantial   Severe  Severe 
    0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8   
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Appendix C. Example Pair of Public Causes143 
 
C.1.  Environmental Harm 
The next question moves outside the legal context. It involves problems of a more 
general nature, which concern society as a whole.  In this part we are interested in your 
reaction as a member of society, rather than as a potential juror. 
Dolphins in many breeding locations are threatened by pollution. The threat to 
breeding locations is expected to result in a decline of the dolphin population. A special 
fund is needed to clean up and protect dolphin breeding locations. 
Increased funding to provide pollution free breeding locations for dolphins must be 
supported mostly by private contributions.  Consider the possibility of making a 
voluntary contribution of money to this fund. 
C.2. Harm to Humans  
The next question moves outside the legal context. It involves problems of a more 
general nature, which concern society as a whole.  In this part we are interested in your 
reaction as a member of society, rather than as a potential juror. 
Farm workers, who are exposed to the sun for many hours, have a higher rate of 
skin cancer than the general population.  Frequent medical checkup can reduce the risk. 
Increased funds are needed to establish programs for more frequent checkups of the 
threatened groups. 
Increased funding for these programs must be supported mostly by private 
contributions.  Consider the possibility of making a voluntary contribution of money to 
this fund.   
C.3.  Response Scales: Isolation 
 
What amount of money (if any) would you be willing to contribute to the fund to 
protect dolphins?  Please write your amount in the blank below.  
 
   $  ___________ 
 
OR 
 
How much personal satisfaction would you expect to get from making a 
contribution a fund to protect dolphins?  (please circle your answer) 
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  no   less  than  for  a a a   
satisfaction a  most  other  moderate  significant  great  extreme 
 at  all  little  contributions amount  amount  deal  satisfaction 
  0 1 2 3 4 5 6 
 
 
C.4.  Response Scales: Comparison 
 
We would like you to compare this problem (farm workers” skin cancer), to the 
problem of public concern that you saw earlier (protection of dolphins). 
 
Compared to protecting dolphins, how much money would you be willing to contribute 
to a fund for farm workers” skin cancer? (circle your choice) 
 
  less than for  the same as for  more than for 
 dolphins  dolphins  dolphins 
 
 
What amount of money (if any) would you be willing to contribute to a fund to 
reduce farm workers” skin cancer?  Please write your amount in the blank below.  
 
   $  ___________ 
 
OR 
 
How much personal satisfaction would you expect to get from making a 
contribution a fund to reduce farm workers” skin cancer?  (please circle your answer) 
 
  no   less  than  for  a a a   
satisfaction a  most  other  moderate  significant  great  extreme 
 at  all  little  contributions amount  amount  deal  satisfaction 
  0 1 2 3 4 5 6   61
Appendix D. Selected Civil Penalties from Administrative Agencies 
 
 
Agency Civil/ 
Criminal 
Type of violation  Penalty 
      
OSHA  Civil  Violation of a serious nature  Up to 7000 
  Civil  Violation of non-serious nature  Up to 7000 
  Civil  Violation of posting requirement  Up to 7000 
  Civil  Willful violation if non-serious or regulatory  No less than 5000 
  Civil  Willful violation if serious  No less than 25000 
  Civil  Repeated violations  Up to 70000 
  Civil  Violation of record keeping- reporting  Up to 7000 
  Civil  Fail to make requested forms available  Up to 3000 
      
FDA  Civil  Egg products inspection act- violation  Up  to 1000 
  Civil  Above + intent to defraud or distribute 
adulterated eggs 
Up to 10000 
  Civil  Federal Meat Inspection act violation  Up to 1000 
  Civil  Above + intent to defraud or distribute 
adulterated meat 
Up to 10000 
  Civil  Violation of sanitary food transportation act  Same as hazardous 
material transport act 
  Criminal  Violation of sanitary food transportation act  Same as hazardous 
material transport act 
  Civil  Violation of Filled milk act  Up to 1000 
  Criminal  Violation of Filled milk act  Up to 1yr prison 
      
EPA  Civil  Administrative penalty for CERCLA and 
EPCRA- class 1 
Up to 25000 a day 
  Civil  “                              “                      “               
  class 2 
Up to 75000 a day 
  Civil  Violation of right to know reporting under 
EPCRA 
Up to 10000 a day 
  Civil  Frivolous trade secret claim under EPCRA  Up to 25000 
  Civil  Administrative violation of  CWA- class 1  Up to 10000 a day 
25000 max 
  Civil  Administrative violation of CWA- class II  Up to 10000 a day 
25000 max  
  Civil  Hazardous substance discharge violation of 
CWA 
Up to 25000  a day   62
  Civil  Above + gross negligence of willful 
misconduct 
No less than 100000 
  Civil  Violation of FIFRA  if for hire applicator or 
dealer 
Up to 1000 
  Civil  Violation of FIFRA if non hire applicator  Up to 500 1st offense 
then up to 1000 
  Civil  Knowingly violate FIFRA if registrant or 
producer 
Max 50,000 
  Civil  Knowingly violate FIFRA if other  Max 25,000 
  Civil  Knowingly violate FIFRA if private 
applicator 
Max 1000 
  Civil  Violation of RCRA  Up to 25000 a day 
  Civil  Knowingly violate financial disclosure for 
solid waste disposal 
Up to 2500 
  Criminal  See above  Up to 1 yr prison 
  Civil  Violation of compliance requirement for solid 
waste 
Up to 25000 a day 
  Criminal  Knowingly transport, treats or stores haz 
waste w/o permit  
Up to 50000 a day or 
2 yr prison 
  Criminal   See above  (except permit) and knows that 
puts person in imminent danger of death or 
serious bodily injury 
Up to 250,000 or 15 yr 
prison 
  Criminal  See above and defendant is organization  Up to 1,000,000 
  Civil  Violates requirement of solid waste disposal  Up to 25000 
  Civil  Owner fails to notify or submits false info 
about underground storage tanks 
Up to 10,000 
      
Fish and 
Wildlife 
Service 
Civil  Violation of Wild Bird Conservation Act    
  Civil  Violate WBCA 111 a1 or 2 (import in 
violation of ban )or permit under 112 ( 
exemptions for sci research and ltd breeding) 
Up to 25000 
  Civil  Knowingly violate and import under WBCA 
11a3 ? 
Up to 12000 
  Civil  If non business related  and violate WBCA  Up to 500 
  Civil  Civil violation of African Elephant 
Conservation Act 
Up to 5000 
  Civil  Violation of  Bald Eagle Protection Act   Up to 5000 
  Civil  Violation of ESA if knowingly violate/in 
business of im/export, taking, possessing etc 
Up to 25000   63
  Civil  Violation of ESA if knowingly violate or 
ex/import and not enumerated above  
Up to 12000 
  Civil  Otherwise violate ESA  Up to 500 
      
EEOC   Civil  Give public info about unlawful employment 
practice under T7 during proceeding 
Up to 1000 
  Criminal  See above  Up to 1 yr prison 
  Civil   Intentional engagement in unlawful 
employment practice under T7 
Reinstate, hire, 
backpay or other 
approp equit relief 
  Civil  Willful failure to post pertinent provisions of 
T7 
Up to 100 
  Civil  Same remedies available as under T7   
  Civil  Discriminatory practice with malice  Punitive damages 
  Civil  Total damages under t7 for small business 
(under 100 employees) 
Up to 50,000 
  Civil  Total damages under T7 for medium 
business (over 100 less than 200 employees) 
Up to 100,000 
  Civil  Total damages under T7 for large business 
(Over 200 less than 500) 
Up to 200,000 
  Civil  Total damages under T7 for big business 
(more than 500) 
Up to 300,000 
  Civil  Willful  violation of section 15 of equal pay 
act 
Up to 10,000 
  Criminal  See above  Up to 6 mo prison 
  Civil  Violation of section 6 or 7 of equal pay act  Liable for wages and 
liquidated damages 
  Civil  Violation of section 212 (child labor) of equal 
pay act 
Up to 10,000 
  Civil  Repeated or willful violation of section 6 or 7 
of EPA 
Up to 1000 
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Appendix E. Cost Per Life Saved 
 
 
Cost-Effectiveness of Selected Regulations 
Regulation  Agency  Cost per premature 
death averted 
($ millions 1990) 
Unvented Space Heater Ban  CPSC  0.1 
Aircraft Cabin Fire Protection Standard  FAA  0.1 
Auto Passive Restraint/Seat Belt Standards  NHTSA  0.1 
Steering Column Protection Standard  NHTSA  0.1 
Underground Construction Standards    OSHA-S  0.1 
Trihalomethane Drinking Water Standards    EPA  0.2 
Aircraft Seat Cushion Flammability Standard    FAA  0.4 
Alcohol and Drug Control Standards  FRA  0.4 
Auto Fuel-System Integrity Standard  NHTSA  0.4 
Standards for Servicing Auto Wheel Rims  OSHA-S  0.4 
Aircraft Floor Emergency Lighting Standard  FAA  0.6 
Concrete & Masonry Construction Standards  OSHA-S  0.6 
Crane Suspended Personnel Platform Standard  OSHA-S  0.7 
Passive Restraints for Trucks & Buses (Proposed) 
    
NHTSA 0.7 
Side-Impact Standards for Autos (Dynamic)   NHTSA  0.8 
Children’s Sleepwear Flammability Ban  CPSC  0.8 
Auto Side Door Support Standards  NHTSA  0.8 
Low Altitude Windshear Equipment & Training 
Standards 
FAA 1.3 
Electrical Equipment Standards (Metal Mines)   MSHA  1.4 
Trenching and Excavation Standards  OSHA-S  1.5 
Traffic Alert and Collision Avoidance (TCAS) Systems
  
FAA 1.5 
Hazard Communication Standard    OSHA-S  1.6 
Side-Impact Standards for Trucks, Buses, and MPVs 
(Proposed) 
NHTSA 2.2 
Grain Dust Explosion Prevention Standards  OSHA-S  2.8 
Rear Lap/Shoulder Belts for Autos  NHTSA  3.2 
Standards for Radionuclides in Uranium Mines  EPA  3.4 
Benzine NESHAP (Original: Fugitive Emissions) 
    
EPA 3.4 
Ethylene Dibromide Drinking Water Standard 
    
EPA 5.7 
Benzene NESHAP (Revised: Coke Byproducts)  EPA  6.1   65
Asbestos Occupational Exposure Limit  OSHA-H  8.3 
Benzene Occupational Exposure Limit  OSHA-H  8.9 
Electrical Equipment Standards (Coal Mines)  MSHA  9.2 
Arsenic Emission Standards for Glass Plants  EPA  13.5 
Ethylene Oxide Occupational Exposure Limit  OSHA-H  20.5 
Arsenic/Copper NESHAP  EPA  23.0 
Hazardous Waste Listing for Petroleum Refining 
Sludge 
EPA 27.6 
Cover/Move Uranium Mill Tailings (Inactive Sites)  EPA  31.7 
Benzene NESHAP (Revised: Transfer Operations)  EPA  32.9 
Cover/Move Uranium Mill Tailings (Active Sites)  EPA  45.0 
Acrylonitrile Occupational Exposure Limit  OSHA-H  51.5 
Coke Ovens Occupational Exposure Limit  OSHA-H  63.5 
Lockout/Tagout OSHA-S  70.9 
Asbestos Occupational Exposure Limit  OSHA-H  74.0 
Arsenic Occupational Exposure Limit  OSHA-H  106.9 
Asbestos Ban  EPA  110.7 
Diethylstilbestrol (DES) Cattlefeed Ban  FDA  124.8 
Benzene NESHAP (Revised: Waste Operations)  EPA  168.2 
1,2 Dichloropropane Drinking Water Standard  EPA  653.0 
Hazardous Waste Land Disposal Ban (1st 3rd)  EPA  4,190.4 
Municipal Solid Waste Landfill Standards (Proposed)  EPA  19,107.0 
Formaldehyde Occupational Exposure Limit  OSHA-H  86,201.8 
Atrazine/Alachlor Drinking Water Standard  EPA  92,069.7 
Hazardous Waste Listing for Wood-Preserving 
Chemicals 
EPA 5,700,000 
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